Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7e012d6710aeeb2a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

26.3 KB Authoring application: cairo 1.8.8 (http://cairographics.org First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 107c28e625912c168f04e5db25f4ba1e SHA-1: e3e2b15e863b440c69db1792f5cf53e93ccf0f75 SHA-256: 7e012d6710aeeb2a827de838f6f37e601031449ec05f004bbd9ce6e16d8a0678
536 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF exploits CVE-2010-1240 via a launch action that executes cmd.exe. It also uses JavaScript to export a data object, which is detected as a Windows executable payload masquerading as a PDF. The embedded executable is detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Rozena-131, indicating a malicious payload delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\ancestor_chart.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://cairographics.org In PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ancestor_chart.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 18 at offset 0x1855 37888 bytes
SHA-256: ab43ddc5844ad2af43a3dd77e320de690c0ccd4727e3403a5a33c28f6a16c3d4
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=ancestor_chart.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0019_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 19 at offset 0x64FB 63 bytes
SHA-256: e271af1fe882f25e71c0136c80c6d914955fdb8d192ba962f0956916ffcb28ab
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "ancestor_chart", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off0000042f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x42F 3872 bytes
SHA-256: 08ca8ec1c25f39eea2c4b64b9895417fe499358a2b88aa0f2769b2ade80cde33

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.