Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 127ca4622bb42f44…

MALICIOUS

PDF

105.9 KB Authoring application: cairo 1.6.0 (http://cairographics.org First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 1c64a5cfdc60f3397d496111996d8f20 SHA-1: f2894bfc305733376c09a2c9e86be4f829ef075c SHA-256: 127ca4622bb42f442371b24df022dfe86483398f7f6b5da7f5feb33874be50c7
636 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF document exploits CVE-2010-1240 to execute arbitrary commands via a launch action. It uses JavaScript to export a data object named 'hunt.pdf', which is actually a Windows executable. The embedded command sequence 'cmd.exe cd "Desktop" cd "My Documents" cd "Documents" start' indicates an attempt to navigate directories and launch the embedded payload. The extracted artifact 'hunt.pdf' was detected as a Trojan with reverse TCP capabilities.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 14

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\hunt.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 1 image(s), only 1 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 105 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://cairographics.org In PDF document text
    • tcp://192.168.111.118:4444In extracted file (hunt.pdf)
    • http://www.islamicfinder.org/prayerPrintable.php?ciIn PDF document text
    • http://fontforge.sf.net/In extracted file (font_00_type1_off000025f8.bin)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
hunt.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0x156CB 37888 bytes
SHA-256: 74792ca3b2cce6cd6fa449b03647bdb25c256e5bdb1e45236e73fbec164f02f2
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.ShellcodeReverseTcp-1
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=hunt.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.111.118:4444 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd
javascript_obj0042_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 42 at offset 0x1A385 53 bytes
SHA-256: 0936a722b1e636b8904ef1e71f08b435ec468fe32619e4c4892873478c9950f5
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "hunt", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_type1_off000025f8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (type1) at offset 0x25F8 36715 bytes
SHA-256: 2103b6602982bc8e478efc2a4cff0f6e23df708d7616ba79c91bcf6722b8adee
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
font_01_sfnt_off0000b702.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB702 9380 bytes
SHA-256: 9b48535711020170a420dff008fe74a1d93c66af001334dbe9e52c224e3cb6d4
font_02_sfnt_off0000d6f9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD6F9 5856 bytes
SHA-256: 3a93441f7e18e339c882d060bf563817012c77f64beae73ae000eaeca8c463b1
font_03_type1_off0000ed2b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (type1) at offset 0xED2B 25284 bytes
SHA-256: 2fb2644c2ee4ebae75bde1dcf7813417b6f3bac82d663207468e544467c29587
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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