Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1347e46613b2de0b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.5 KB Authoring application: cairo 1.7.4 (http://cairographics.org First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: f1bb5484ff751fb770bead5d2d7849da SHA-1: 14b340685c8fa6e46310ae8b3d228326c7cf7579 SHA-256: 1347e46613b2de0baac8480ad48bcb58866e0aab29626ce8aafda3c3e9a5b060
616 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF contains a launch action that executes cmd.exe, which in turn renames an embedded executable disguised as 'july09commute.pdf' to 'july09commute.exe' and then launches it. The embedded JavaScript API 'this.exportDataObject' is used to facilitate the dropping of the executable. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Rozena-131, indicating a trojan downloader or dropper.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-13818 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-13818
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C (if exist "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents\\july09commute.pdf" (cd "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://cairographics.org In PDF document text
    • https://psportal.mantech.com/psc/exprd/EMPLOYIn PDF document text
    • tcp://172.17.230.53:80In extracted file (july09commute.pdf)

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
july09commute.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 79 at offset 0x10467 37888 bytes
SHA-256: f09ad3f69aa0cb562239973be8cc9321f57b01be4ea7d5b2f8f47abe2fea2941
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=july09commute.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 172.17.230.53:80 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0080_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 80 at offset 0x1511E 62 bytes
SHA-256: a7e6a230ca3a44dc7c83c49f5fc903c439a0bf317f02fbea012a7c8f72ebf16e
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "july09commute", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off00009911.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9911 13032 bytes
SHA-256: 664c27a505416d9c65d24bc9110c0612ea21c8b8374b463c8fd8b7f169434990
font_01_sfnt_off0000c49d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC49D 17244 bytes
SHA-256: d60690518ed5c088ab10bde5e7a0d629f39b67f02bea864d08a9f522db15eae3