Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f1df53e93f31e447…

MALICIOUS

PDF

28.0 KB First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: b8600a93bf2b3dd756c57802dae0766f SHA-1: 62cfd56daf03dbba858bf55f0ff60ce1cd3f2fbd SHA-256: f1df53e93f31e44783381d7ae334dae97b5faa2258daf83b2156fe7263032e45
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a launch action that executes cmd.exe, indicating an attempt to exploit CVE-2010-1240. The embedded artifact 'form.pdf' is detected as a Windows executable payload by ClamAV, specifically identified as 'Win.Trojan.Rozena-131'. This suggests the PDF acts as a dropper for a secondary malicious executable.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\form.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL tcp://1.1.1.1:443 In extracted file (form.pdf)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
form.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 28 at offset 0x1FA0 37888 bytes
SHA-256: c05fcae549a4e30bb382063bcd2a74dda6a7c433437f6b75343be78825ff244e
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=form.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 1.1.1.1:443 (reverse/x86, placeholder) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0029_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 29 at offset 0x6C08 53 bytes
SHA-256: eff4a0943aaff2d99cb5c8666337775c91d4d5f687782df94d2c5fc77becde7f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "form", nLaunch: 0 });
icc_00_off000002b7.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x2B7 1296 bytes
SHA-256: 94722fe267764797f8887379cc0d355f5118beb3d186e087bfbd9e1a3f2d3f49
font_00_sfnt_off0000068e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x68E 7304 bytes
SHA-256: 81743f363344ff7f5559be05d6f920883b48412956743e9f887a03c09af552b9

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