Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f6be5f26e6892b35…

MALICIOUS

PDF

36.5 KB Created: 2010-03-01 08:22:08 -03:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.1) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: 9b591e2c152eb05356f2de5e562a31c8 SHA-1: ca7344edf623752e990134f40bc6dd164285fca6 SHA-256: f6be5f26e6892b355302baded80e634745ca300bdfd8e08ee074d9be6467e194
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1187 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file contains a JavaScript action that triggers a launch action, exploiting CVE-2010-1240 to execute cmd.exe. The executed command attempts to change the directory and potentially interact with a file named 'teste.pdf' located on the desktop. Furthermore, an embedded PE payload, also masquerading as 'teste.pdf', was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Rozena-131, indicating it's a malicious executable.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\teste.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL tcp://201.25.144.153:4455 In extracted file (teste.pdf)
    • http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000015f.bin)
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_timesnewroman.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000015f.bin)
🗂 Part of campaign: shared payload 52212058b3 3 samples

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
teste.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 17 at offset 0x4180 37888 bytes
SHA-256: 310051ec1fe51373f25c25f33ea88ef44dba09fdbae9e3eb6ff3ce62605f6f9b
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=teste.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 201.25.144.153:4455 (reverse/x86, public) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0018_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 18 at offset 0x8E3B 54 bytes
SHA-256: 52212058b3bf4a94069e8fd5b07a00a0ba0b6f6d7a10aa614bf6cdd7c3dba282
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "teste", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off0000015f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15F 26736 bytes
SHA-256: bc6fee68927bee2193453dd63ebec1279c80647372bab17dffa3f3c1f4fa03e5

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