Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fdd2d8aaf517adc6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

35.2 KB Created: 2009-08-30 00:20:17 UTC Authoring application: AdobePS5.dll Version 5.2.2 (via Mac OS X 10.5.8 Quartz PDFContext) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: cfa559a4591b10cd1a7a232e43ad6f94 SHA-1: 34d7e1e04fee9885bd4e9863aa770b35fd5eff31 SHA-256: fdd2d8aaf517adc6caec6f207dd0fad3ae295ba4952683da047ed6e0005cfbfb
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. This command then renames an embedded executable (form.pdf) to form.exe and runs it. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Rozena-131, indicating a malicious payload. The JavaScript API 'this.exportDataObject' is used to drop the payload, and the launch action targets cmd.exe, directly leading to the execution of the embedded PE file.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C (if exist "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents\\form.pdf" (cd "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL tcp://192.168.118.118:443 In extracted file (form.pdf)
    • http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off000002d6.icc)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
form.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 21 at offset 0x3B9E 37888 bytes
SHA-256: 0a5bf99bc2ccd7267be5e53eeaae2ffd959da58d8627ae4f525fc4a02b1c53e2
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=form.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.118.118:443 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0022_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 22 at offset 0x8898 53 bytes
SHA-256: eff4a0943aaff2d99cb5c8666337775c91d4d5f687782df94d2c5fc77becde7f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "form", nLaunch: 0 });
icc_00_off000002d6.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x2D6 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e
font_00_sfnt_off00000e23.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE23 13900 bytes
SHA-256: ac6efb60566e49cb2cc918348e471fe3f01c12322c4aa7ec58d84bf608cab323

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