PDF malware analysis — malicious · f2dc926b3bcc4d3f

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.0 KB Created: 2007-11-29 12:43:20 +01:00 Authoring application: PDFCreator Version 0.9.0 (via GPL Ghostscript 8.50) First seen: 2026-05-10

MD5: 18948fc42bf8cd0b56f27c3a2d08e3d0 SHA-1: 181f6d867c4513b4ddb37ec54590a098c97def2d SHA-256: f2dc926b3bcc4d3f2b43d212a733f62aa84b586a1a68a428ac89c9a9582bc686

616 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains a critical PDF_LAUNCH heuristic firing, indicating it attempts to execute cmd.exe. This is further supported by the CVE_2010_1240 detection, which specifically flags the use of a launch action to execute cmd.exe with shell parameters. An embedded PE payload was also extracted, identified by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Rozena-131, suggesting the primary purpose is to download and execute a malicious executable.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 13

Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240

PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH

PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND

PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\MSAPIFPH.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH

An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS

PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND

Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL tcp://192.168.4.111:4444 In extracted file (MSAPIFPH.pdf)
- http://shinnai.altervista.orgIn PDF document text
- http://msdn2.microsoft.com/En-US/library/bb759869.aspxIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`MSAPIFPH.pdf`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 35 at offset 0x671B	37888 bytes
SHA-256: `bcf0c0866de8fb5f4199fec510378c0a78821cb3eca98f1a56d3cb396005ffd1`
Detection ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131 Obfuscation or payload: likely actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=MSAPIFPH.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.4.111:4444 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
`javascript_obj0036_000.js`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 36 at offset 0xB40E	57 bytes
SHA-256: `da8f61d9ea790df8a04cef8e9e654188b03028cf7e8985c18fcb773bf5135b32`
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script this.exportDataObject({ cName: "MSAPIFPH", nLaunch: 0 });
`font_00_sfnt_off0000503c.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x503C	9728 bytes
SHA-256: `5b8e477ec7bd6fc5c90fb50d18a09a61262a5912674b524a812db8ebcb6299f1`

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PDF

Malware Insights

Machine Learning

Heuristics 13

Related samples 7

Extracted artifacts 3