Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 501672ee7400fde4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.5 KB Created: 2007-02-21 15:01:28 -08:00 Authoring application: PScript5.dll Version 5.2.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 7.0.5 (Windows)) First seen: 2020-06-01
MD5: d194d1fe13e8b3856361f41d3c829590 SHA-1: 6e4c97e65c895fbfb1185af283166be27adbaa56 SHA-256: 501672ee7400fde49cd8a83f2164541defd2a6968a12c6c50b047f539ca6a35e
616 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document exploits CVE-2010-1240 to execute cmd.exe, which then attempts to launch an embedded executable disguised as 'plants.pdf'. The embedded JavaScript API 'this.exportDataObject' is used to drop this payload. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7, indicating it is likely a malicious second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\plants.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (plants.pdf)
    • tcp://192.168.1.121:4444In extracted file (plants.pdf)
    • http://king.wsu.edu/gardening/fs02.htmIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off00001ced.icc)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
plants.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 78 at offset 0x94FA 73802 bytes
SHA-256: a9e0dd09506f2525e8271a86834cb91ecd22d043865852c1e86c1f76bf2ae83e
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=plants.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.1.121:4444 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_REVERSE, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0079_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 79 at offset 0x1412F 55 bytes
SHA-256: 2f83cd4b480b48702baafda7fc114ce59035080a700f836ff83e93d8771e7884
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "plants", nLaunch: 0 });
icc_00_off00001ced.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x1CED 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e

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