Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 80ed5f9ac6568415…

MALICIOUS

PDF

66.2 KB Created: 2004-08-14 21:48:01 Authoring application: PDFCreator Version 0.8.0 (via AFPL Ghostscript 8.14) First seen: 2013-09-17
MD5: 2c85ea74880d224c44a59ef3b77be26c SHA-1: 05f01f7a1ab31aa539058913569f7b816d4b815c SHA-256: 80ed5f9ac6568415ae71e852d472385b0b11a40a8b1e8128649e9a530730b92b
616 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains embedded JavaScript that triggers a launch action, exploiting CVE-2010-1240 to execute cmd.exe. This action is designed to export and launch an embedded executable file disguised as 'a.pdf', which was detected as a Windows executable by ClamAV. The embedded JavaScript also contains URLs that may be used for command and control or further payload delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\a.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.radarhack.com In PDF document text
    • http://www.whitehat.co.ilIn PDF document text
    • http://www.osvdb.org/548In PDF document text
    • http://www.zeustech.net/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (a.pdf)
    • tcp://192.168.2.100:4444In extracted file (a.pdf)
    • http://www.metasploit.com/projects/Framework/downloads.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-023.mspxIn PDF document text
    • http://lists.insecure.org/lists/bugtraq/2001/May/0011.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
🗂 Part of campaign: hping.org 4 samples

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
a.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 48 at offset 0x57F4 73802 bytes
SHA-256: 5e0e50b7622dbcc2a28945d0c059bf4cea187c144326807ad580b95ec873d2e5
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=a.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.2.100:4444 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0049_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 49 at offset 0x10461 50 bytes
SHA-256: 3505343638f6dc9858d159b020c197aaba8da7d8ae890f622c0c584ff15672cf
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "a", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off000043fa.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x43FA 5156 bytes
SHA-256: d6ae02802470d0f852e985039e81bcddc1be6a73926ec4144f32a9dae59be766