MALICIOUS
616
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1059.007 JavaScript
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the `exportDataObject` function to drop and launch an embedded executable payload, disguised as 'swu.pdf'. This payload is detected as a Windows executable by static triage and ClamAV, and is associated with the Rozena trojan. The PDF also contains a launch action targeting `cmd.exe`, indicating a chain of execution designed to run the embedded payload. The embedded executable is likely a Metasploit stager, further suggesting malicious intent.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9981
Heuristics 13
-
Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
-
ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
-
Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
-
Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
-
/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMANDPDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\swu.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
-
Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCHAn /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
-
Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
-
/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JSPDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
-
LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMANDExtracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
-
JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
-
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
-
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
-
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.color.org In PDF document text
- tcp://212.96.138.130:443In extracted file (swu.pdf)
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/aux/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/camera-raw-settings/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/In PDF document text
Extracted artifacts 9
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
swu.pdf |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 61 at offset 0xA4B63 | 37888 bytes |
SHA-256: be1c4cbf3acb8f62f35969460b8b14c30aeef413edef0381d69b795c3621b667 |
|||
|
Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=swu.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 212.96.138.130:443 (reverse/x86, public) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
|
|||
javascript_obj0062_000.js |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 62 at offset 0xA9851 | 52 bytes |
SHA-256: dbdedcc603fa160eff0694c9308595dfec5d1cde6ac35fcaf9a85a2df546e5d1 |
|||
Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "swu", nLaunch: 0 });
|
|||
stream_023_off000454f7.bin |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x454F7 | 557168 bytes |
SHA-256: 35f401731df11a4eba3502af632e51d68bc394bcb7d34632a331c1ba3f4a0bf6 |
|||
font_00_cff_off0001507b.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x1507B | 4629 bytes |
SHA-256: e5d4fb7375f15cc4fc53cbb369d6ba501c303fa1d59ae1274630bba6cad89c57 |
|||
font_01_cff_off00015fb5.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x15FB5 | 1454 bytes |
SHA-256: bb92cede0f8fbc56f9499c054f3f6e4eaef9523b8baeac90b1df30e69a764dbb |
|||
font_02_cff_off00016513.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x16513 | 4941 bytes |
SHA-256: c06ca3269f87151c034987c542f0c91c71006b88a6df0c6d29b8be29d99302e1 |
|||
font_03_cff_off0001751b.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x1751B | 5567 bytes |
SHA-256: fd7adfe91927a730a452ce587d6cb53def796f493061154c14f793b5e80fdc96 |
|||
font_04_cff_off0002857d.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x2857D | 328 bytes |
SHA-256: 71ffec79965f2ada5533c6e2eecd483308f11346a4718619d31ea96590c99a1e |
|||
font_05_cff_off0003f56a.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x3F56A | 1801 bytes |
SHA-256: 2d8e3486809f5338225dacbd3e8ccbad2aae90e4d1c6f7239b2f7de49add101f |
|||
Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.