MALICIOUS
584
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
This PDF file exploits CVE-2010-1240 via a launch action that executes cmd.exe. The command-line parameters indicate that it attempts to execute an embedded PE payload. ClamAV detections confirm the malicious nature of both the PDF and the extracted payload. The embedded executable is likely a secondary stage downloader or dropper.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9982
Heuristics 14
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Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
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ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-17559 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-17559
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Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
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Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
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/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMANDPDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\pdf.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
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Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCHAn /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
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/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JSPDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
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Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LUREDocument tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
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Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTONDocument contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL https://127.0.0.1:3780 In PDF document text
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
🗂 Part of campaign:
127.0.0.1
4 samples
Extracted artifacts 15
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
pdf.pdf |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 162 at offset 0x324FF | 37888 bytes |
SHA-256: df0fc3036d9d7a34674225c8ff547fbdfc83b4d41c7101577a861acc4de0ea59 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-6360728-0
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=pdf.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
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javascript_obj0163_000.js |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 163 at offset 0x37204 | 52 bytes |
SHA-256: 43c541c654fef21cf523c77fa0bd58c79db84e77b5febae0582d6bdff7dc683a |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "pdf", nLaunch: 0 });
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stream_014_off0000d689.bin |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xD689 | 4666 bytes |
SHA-256: dca245cedcf22d5b26267e22d36eac9268cec5a9e9f27c8236eec5123a66a74f |
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font_00_cff_off00000d3a.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xD3A | 6111 bytes |
SHA-256: b0c5c9e3163b7417b7ede0d8237d4fb0e25a00c9404f12156bea3c9f20d22c78 |
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font_01_cff_off00002c8a.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x2C8A | 5384 bytes |
SHA-256: f4eeda6e5d2cb9bbcf05b224c5d7fae5cfdae199c52f025323300cbebe7f7a8b |
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font_02_sfnt_off00004394.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4394 | 9080 bytes |
SHA-256: 1d323dae2cd4830cc9befa2da6f0bda00ed884a90bb0e84badc369384ce1198e |
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font_03_sfnt_off0001b8cb.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1B8CB | 39160 bytes |
SHA-256: 35565c6fad5feb01179aa012445c1466f551371c605de7e4af4175623451bf8f |
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font_04_sfnt_off00021519.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x21519 | 23776 bytes |
SHA-256: 190305fcc6034e92e35594b4a7d887b23148a835a99328630372f1cfcf4fe41b |
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font_05_cff_off00023df9.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x23DF9 | 12355 bytes |
SHA-256: 73f557a71b8ecfed208c3d13f501aa1c9568932c4a091b68351e88294f42051f |
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font_06_sfnt_off00026bfb.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x26BFB | 5884 bytes |
SHA-256: 67468f5cf48b0e46d6d125ca4955e7655cef9ec7d4c43f4fb86bff5c71daae6a |
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font_07_cff_off0002827d.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x2827D | 5526 bytes |
SHA-256: 0c6896733810b9242586ca373541c3ebdde6e5a91b53b588f7e687690fa1f0d2 |
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font_08_sfnt_off0002984b.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2984B | 21736 bytes |
SHA-256: 8e7b88b0245cd71bc38839e5fba3f7917a9a4065fb031442f6ee84a73775e8b3 |
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font_09_sfnt_off0002b8fa.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2B8FA | 23480 bytes |
SHA-256: 4c487e09361a14da36cfae1dc1a85eb0ef677e44026c076ec3bc08b79beb7afb |
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font_10_cff_off0002da9b.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x2DA9B | 6968 bytes |
SHA-256: 852f9f7434f94b437d2db4145a4c638f64baad01373c6ddef2ecae7dbd0dd920 |
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font_11_cff_off0002f86b.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x2F86B | 3898 bytes |
SHA-256: 8b5e0d718003c46a9c478822a887647f1e47ff4f5259855735ac812464d310d0 |
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