Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5d0fcc66a88676cc…

MALICIOUS

PDF

239.8 KB Created: 2017-12-02 20:37:43 -09:00 Authoring application: Microsoft® Word 2010
MD5: a53c17f5bbfb269a82c3e70cff634f64 SHA-1: 36c74801e8928632ad016ddc2e119f129a9e1d9e SHA-256: 5d0fcc66a88676cc95012050613d7589e0875ef4da1f776a1f553fcc12217b66
658 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the `exportDataObject` function, which is known to be used for launching embedded executables. This is further supported by critical heuristics indicating a PDF launch action targeting `cmd.exe` with parameters that suggest execution of an embedded payload named 'Denali_Departure4.pdf'. The embedded artifact is identified as a Windows executable by ClamAV, and the overall behavior aligns with a malicious document dropper.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 16

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED
    PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\Denali_Departure4.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.mckinieycapital.com/feedback.html
    • https://www.mckinIeycapital.com/feedback.html
    • http://www.zeustech.net/
    • http://]hostname[:port]/path
    • http://www.apache.org/
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://fontfabrik.comYou
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspx
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crl0X
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicCodSigPCA_08-31-2010.crl0Z
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicCodSigPCA_08-31-2010.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microsoftrootcert.crl0T
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftRootCert.crt0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/0

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
Denali_Departure4.pdf
7025a537985f610dea56d02b27e8c43074f3d694dbb6b0d7be63a20bd7123497		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 35 at offset 0x30CC4 73802 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-6360728-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0036_000.js
ce2aa3d4ca67761cb885029fc22b8969af3343dcad7d1f77c1d6b139e2a3f1b1		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 36 at offset 0x3B981 66 bytes
stream_003_off000070a5.bin
3bd87a5f57145be95e649c58bdacf616a37797421bd4d07a9ba3cf11b3db537a		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x70A5 184148 bytes
stream_004_off0001c416.bin
36bf53635724ddba450805342eb731a726acadf647fc67ad679bf147780061f4		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x1C416 175472 bytes

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