Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 de9d1a8949c0f7f6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

471.3 KB Created: 2004-06-01 07:56:41 +02:00 Authoring application: PScript5.dll Version 5.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 6.0 (Windows)) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 369d5b2755ad58eb1a0bf7d72c0319dc SHA-1: baa176ca1c1348e3da1efef3f5314733ea89ee82 SHA-256: de9d1a8949c0f7f6f50869e6a75f711120d1da29d4e6a3d4efe30e7e431850b2
536 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: User Execution: Malicious File T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF contains JavaScript and a launch action that targets cmd.exe, exploiting CVE-2010-1240. This action is designed to execute an embedded Windows executable payload (stream_017_off0006ac5a.bin), indicating a downloader or dropper functionality. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-6360728-0.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9973

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\german.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (german.pdf)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off0000229e.icc)

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
german.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 58 at offset 0x6AC5A 73802 bytes
SHA-256: 000c3e8462acc521ad2e3ac5a219d361744dbaf78757370cdf4cc6a844cb424a
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-6360728-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=german.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0059_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 59 at offset 0x758D3 55 bytes
SHA-256: 2dc9a84542f8c168aed417e19bbfd70eb9e8f08c5276ec19801c8bc72b403571
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "german", nLaunch: 0 });
stream_007_off000135a0.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x135A0 438900 bytes
SHA-256: eac11ef6619f9b431672789fba2b59053461d4c72641f10e475a3b361ada2ec6
stream_016_off0006825d.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x6825D 9704 bytes
SHA-256: 0230251823bff3d5134ec7dc4211f5d3917cb5bda70d5ef2208cacb3506312c9
icc_00_off0000229e.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x229E 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e
font_00_sfnt_off00000f25.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF25 8984 bytes
SHA-256: 83c55e954cb441aeaa28f6ba6b1f232a06c99bed3f81d4f75ef55dc2259b8023