Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a9158b7afa83b559…

MALICIOUS

PDF

129.0 KB Created: 2014-07-02 11:50:02 +02:00 Authoring application: Microsoft® Word 2010
MD5: 8c8f44fc6684e03bc6da0c551876b5df SHA-1: b3a004c38a335594a8dff1363065ec27f3740b32 SHA-256: a9158b7afa83b559c93fe71dbf921227d6f60f3badb8dcc05b06dcd1c7850a0e
464 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a launch action that targets cmd.exe, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands. Critical heuristics confirm that this launch action is chained with an embedded Windows executable payload, disguised as a PDF file named 'factuur_514.pdf'. This payload is likely the primary malware component, delivered via a known PDF exploit (CVE-2010-1240 and CVE-2023-26369 related).

Heuristics 11

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED
    PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\factuur_514.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
factuur_514.pdf
c35958f82aa6b1656dc9f6feade13fd69eecae0b4da10aba91940cf4c4672aec
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 26 at offset 0x15237 73802 bytes
javascript_obj0027_000.js
c6e617fd4a2cf8f60280b220af2a2d8af5ee9840733c91615693225df1d1bd29
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 27 at offset 0x1FEA3 60 bytes
stream_002_off000008e2.bin
34cb2040856807618b6feabf35d22a6ecd88716335f9813d87486efe83bd4bc3
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x8E2 178452 bytes