MALICIOUS
624
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1059.007 JavaScript
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that triggers a launch action for cmd.exe. The JavaScript also attempts to export a data object named 'pdf', which is identified as a Windows executable payload masquerading as a PDF. The embedded executable is detected as Win.Trojan.Rozena-131 by ClamAV. The document body contains text that appears to be a lure for installing NeXpose software, and includes commands to execute 'pdf.pdf' via cmd.exe.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9982
Heuristics 14
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Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
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ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
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Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
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Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
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/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMANDPDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\pdf.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
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Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCHAn /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
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Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JSPDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
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Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LUREDocument tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
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JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTONDocument contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL https://127.0.0.1:3780 In PDF document text
- tcp://192.168.0.1:4444In extracted file (pdf.pdf)
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
🗂 Part of campaign:
127.0.0.1
4 samples
Extracted artifacts 15
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
pdf.pdf |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 162 at offset 0x324FF | 37888 bytes |
SHA-256: 50200cb2f83c339abd27fd81d7115503af735982b4060286124c8473cdc2d00c |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=pdf.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.0.1:4444 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
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javascript_obj0163_000.js |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 163 at offset 0x371E4 | 52 bytes |
SHA-256: 43c541c654fef21cf523c77fa0bd58c79db84e77b5febae0582d6bdff7dc683a |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "pdf", nLaunch: 0 });
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stream_014_off0000d689.bin |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xD689 | 4666 bytes |
SHA-256: dca245cedcf22d5b26267e22d36eac9268cec5a9e9f27c8236eec5123a66a74f |
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font_00_cff_off00000d3a.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xD3A | 6111 bytes |
SHA-256: b0c5c9e3163b7417b7ede0d8237d4fb0e25a00c9404f12156bea3c9f20d22c78 |
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font_01_cff_off00002c8a.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x2C8A | 5384 bytes |
SHA-256: f4eeda6e5d2cb9bbcf05b224c5d7fae5cfdae199c52f025323300cbebe7f7a8b |
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font_02_sfnt_off00004394.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4394 | 9080 bytes |
SHA-256: 1d323dae2cd4830cc9befa2da6f0bda00ed884a90bb0e84badc369384ce1198e |
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font_03_sfnt_off0001b8cb.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1B8CB | 39160 bytes |
SHA-256: 35565c6fad5feb01179aa012445c1466f551371c605de7e4af4175623451bf8f |
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font_04_sfnt_off00021519.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x21519 | 23776 bytes |
SHA-256: 190305fcc6034e92e35594b4a7d887b23148a835a99328630372f1cfcf4fe41b |
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font_05_cff_off00023df9.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x23DF9 | 12355 bytes |
SHA-256: 73f557a71b8ecfed208c3d13f501aa1c9568932c4a091b68351e88294f42051f |
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font_06_sfnt_off00026bfb.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x26BFB | 5884 bytes |
SHA-256: 67468f5cf48b0e46d6d125ca4955e7655cef9ec7d4c43f4fb86bff5c71daae6a |
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font_07_cff_off0002827d.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x2827D | 5526 bytes |
SHA-256: 0c6896733810b9242586ca373541c3ebdde6e5a91b53b588f7e687690fa1f0d2 |
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font_08_sfnt_off0002984b.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2984B | 21736 bytes |
SHA-256: 8e7b88b0245cd71bc38839e5fba3f7917a9a4065fb031442f6ee84a73775e8b3 |
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font_09_sfnt_off0002b8fa.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2B8FA | 23480 bytes |
SHA-256: 4c487e09361a14da36cfae1dc1a85eb0ef677e44026c076ec3bc08b79beb7afb |
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font_10_cff_off0002da9b.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x2DA9B | 6968 bytes |
SHA-256: 852f9f7434f94b437d2db4145a4c638f64baad01373c6ddef2ecae7dbd0dd920 |
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font_11_cff_off0002f86b.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x2F86B | 3898 bytes |
SHA-256: 8b5e0d718003c46a9c478822a887647f1e47ff4f5259855735ac812464d310d0 |
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