Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 14

• Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
  PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
• ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
• Embedded PDF child has suspicious static findings critical PDF_EMBEDDED_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
  PDF contains an embedded PDF stream whose extracted child matches suspicious or malicious PDF heuristics. Wrapper PDFs are commonly used to hide the actual exploit or lure payload from scanners that do not recursively inspect attachments.
• Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
  PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
• Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
  PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
• /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
  PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\Gestion_General_Parte1.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
• Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
  An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
• /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
  PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
• Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
  PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
• JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
  PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• Remote GoTo action info PDF_GOTO_REMOTE
  PDF has GoToR/GoToE actions that reference sibling document files — typical of multi-part document bundles
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://ocsp.verisign.com0 In extracted file (stream_006_off0000fdac.bin)

  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
  • http://crl.verisign.com/ThawteTimestampingCA.crl0In extracted file (stream_006_off0000fdac.bin)
  • http://crl.verisign.com/tss-ca.crl0In extracted file (stream_006_off0000fdac.bin)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA2.crl0OIn extracted file (stream_006_off0000fdac.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CodeSignPCA2.crt0In extracted file (stream_006_off0000fdac.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typographyIn extracted file (stream_006_off0000fdac.bin)
  • http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off000071f2.icc)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.