Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f4e861eec510a0d3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

401.9 KB Created: 2011-04-18 15:20:20 +08:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.0)
MD5: ae39b747e4fe72dce6e5cdc6d0314c02 SHA-1: 18306c34c5769f66573b725dce70a353ff549857 SHA-256: f4e861eec510a0d38ae8fa54b630fdda40011891d12925e0e74da39d9280ddd8
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is a PDF with embedded RichMedia (Flash) and a secondary embedded PDF, as indicated by the PDF_RICHMEDIA and POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_MALICIOUS heuristics. The ML classifier also flagged it as malicious. The presence of these embedded artifacts suggests an attempt to exploit vulnerabilities or deliver further malicious content. The document body is heavily obfuscated and contains no readable text, providing no additional context on the lure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9536

Heuristics 5

  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objstm_0026_00.bin
0841ed6ca2149b386133777ff3868f6222ba5033d6f52cd654a117610818bd40		 pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 26 0 obj (inflated) 1084 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00062b29.pdf
fe1583c05ef0f6ed7c71670ad19cd2a07df15d70ab1eb8a466454eab6eb1f527		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x62B29 7293 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00062fb9.pdf
0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x62FB9 6125 bytes

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