Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 21fe40e4cc007989…

MALICIOUS

PDF

47.6 KB Created: 2011-04-18 15:20:20 +08:00 Authoring application: xyghPDF SDK 4.3 (via BCL easyPDF 4.30 (0615))
MD5: 4cb9a0e680d1c49204e0142b5e7c5710 SHA-1: dc1f48da04f31a8b88397d1f88ea0d6b312636f5 SHA-256: 21fe40e4cc007989b217796b38a8910e957aaac06361bdf3e50e26f4e9106374
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a PDF file that contains embedded objects, including other PDFs, which is a common technique for delivering exploits. The 'POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE' heuristic firing indicates that these embedded PDFs have suspicious static findings, suggesting they are part of the exploit chain. The 'PDF_RICHMEDIA' and 'PDF_EMBEDDED' heuristics further support the presence of malicious embedded content. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was unreadable, but the embedded artifacts and heuristics strongly suggest an exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 5

  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objstm_0026_00.bin
0841ed6ca2149b386133777ff3868f6222ba5033d6f52cd654a117610818bd40		 pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 26 0 obj (inflated) 1084 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000a335.pdf
4044524e0d63e7a8080f48c5c2ac2d90f174bca6a94b7529f245da6d43f70bcf		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0xA335 6976 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000a688.pdf
0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0xA688 6125 bytes

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