Pdf.Dropper.Agent-6040950-0 — PDF malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3701a5da3f1836d4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

401.9 KB Created: 2011-04-18 15:20:20 +08:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.0) First seen: 2013-09-09
MD5: 4065b98fdcb17a081759061306239c8b SHA-1: bc50074e7b672a59b961f281708b652323a7acc3 SHA-256: 3701a5da3f1836d48e10e09b4245d9a53b0ba685732cac69cea0b672cf7b3afb
264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Pdf.Dropper.Agent-6040950-0 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a PDF file that contains an embedded Adobe Flash Player exploit (CVE-2011-0611). This exploit is designed to download and execute a secondary payload, as indicated by the 'Pdf.Dropper.Agent-6040950-0' ClamAV detection and the presence of embedded artifacts. The embedded URLs are confirmed benign and do not appear to be directly involved in the malicious execution chain.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9536

Heuristics 8

  • Adobe Flash Player RichMedia exploit critical CVE likely CVE_2011_0611_FLASH_RICHMEDIA
    PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation with an embedded AS3 SWF loader (ByteArray/loadBytes) and shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static exploit shape associated with CVE-2011-0611 Flash content delivered through Adobe Reader.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-6040950-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-6040950-0
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objstm_0026_00.bin pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 26 0 obj (inflated) 1084 bytes
SHA-256: 0841ed6ca2149b386133777ff3868f6222ba5033d6f52cd654a117610818bd40
polyglot_child_pdf_off00062b2d.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x62B2D 7293 bytes
SHA-256: fe1583c05ef0f6ed7c71670ad19cd2a07df15d70ab1eb8a466454eab6eb1f527
polyglot_child_pdf_off00062fbd.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x62FBD 6125 bytes
SHA-256: 0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8

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