Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3701a5da3f1836d4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

401.9 KB Created: 2011-04-18 15:20:20 +08:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.0)
MD5: 4065b98fdcb17a081759061306239c8b SHA-1: bc50074e7b672a59b961f281708b652323a7acc3 SHA-256: 3701a5da3f1836d48e10e09b4245d9a53b0ba685732cac69cea0b672cf7b3afb
170 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is identified as a malicious PDF by ClamAV, specifically 'Pdf.Dropper.Agent-6040950-0'. Static analysis reveals it contains embedded content, including a RichMedia (Flash) object and a secondary PDF. The presence of these embedded elements, combined with the 'POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE' heuristic, strongly suggests the PDF is designed to exploit vulnerabilities or act as a dropper for further malicious activity. The document body was truncated and unreadable, providing no direct clues about the lure.

Heuristics 6

  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-6040950-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-6040950-0
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objstm_0026_00.bin
0841ed6ca2149b386133777ff3868f6222ba5033d6f52cd654a117610818bd40		 pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 26 0 obj (inflated) 1084 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00062b2d.pdf
fe1583c05ef0f6ed7c71670ad19cd2a07df15d70ab1eb8a466454eab6eb1f527		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x62B2D 7293 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00062fbd.pdf
0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x62FBD 6125 bytes

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