PDF malware analysis — malicious · 6d05bb31f4ae3f1a

MALICIOUS

PDF

401.9 KB Created: 2011-04-18 15:20:20 +08:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.0)

MD5: 2368a8f55ee78d844896f05f94866b07 SHA-1: f636e24d394e2d6084af877271ef488153b63181 SHA-256: 6d05bb31f4ae3f1a2e03879396c301e8bd7f5f53c368e16b006baa459d61c040

264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF document contains an embedded Adobe Flash RichMedia exploit (CVE-2011-0611) which is designed to execute a shellcode payload. Static analysis also identified a secondary embedded PDF with suspicious findings, indicating a dropper functionality. ClamAV detection confirms the malicious nature of the file.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9536

Heuristics 8

Adobe Flash Player RichMedia exploit critical CVE likely CVE_2011_0611_FLASH_RICHMEDIA

PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation with an embedded AS3 SWF loader (ByteArray/loadBytes) and shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static exploit shape associated with CVE-2011-0611 Flash content delivered through Adobe Reader.
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-6040895-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-6040895-0
RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA

PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE

PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objstm_0026_00.bin` `0841ed6ca2149b386133777ff3868f6222ba5033d6f52cd654a117610818bd40`	pdf-objstm-decoded	PDF /ObjStm 26 0 obj (inflated)	1084 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00062b2d.pdf` `fe1583c05ef0f6ed7c71670ad19cd2a07df15d70ab1eb8a466454eab6eb1f527`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x62B2D	7293 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00062fbd.pdf` `0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x62FBD	6125 bytes

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