Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d88bb9e56d70bf34…

MALICIOUS

PDF

226.7 KB Created: 2013-08-30 09:57:56 -02:00 Authoring application: PrimoPDF http://www.primopdf.com (via Nitro PDF PrimoPDF)
MD5: 31071ba52c699ca1544880bdd69428b8 SHA-1: 75507da5119468412befb67a4a1b516a3d0026cc SHA-256: d88bb9e56d70bf3430a162e363b8205c249f4958b0fc871a16e198a3bce3e4d4
424 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains a critical PDF_LAUNCH heuristic firing, indicating a launch action. This action is configured to execute 'cmd.exe' with parameters that suggest an attempt to run a payload. Furthermore, a critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD heuristic indicates that a Windows executable is embedded within the PDF, masquerading as 'yahoo.pdf'. The PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS heuristic confirms the presence of JavaScript used to export this embedded data object. This combination strongly suggests the document is a dropper designed to execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 11

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\yahoo.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.primopdf.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
yahoo.pdf
52b410bbe0252245babbc7cf819bea50d50a9b5bf121e5d42944f26c9873f533		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 67 at offset 0x2DA01 73802 bytes
javascript_obj0068_000.js
d035c3545dc580d1836caed0f14c04053ebb30fbd5187d5d3c92d881d1f008d2		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 68 at offset 0x38625 54 bytes
stream_016_off00028929.bin
a14c062ac59d61d020f348314bbda4ee56f09f88b5b06f23305c2be81caf0c93		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x28929 30560 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0002665d.bin
3dbbdd4756746e7f4056c6848e08b170be4dc0cbff04ac7a02fa27c100cad280		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2665D 25236 bytes
font_01_cff_off000283c6.bin
a39600588b38719a2d3219aa4f90b72f2f71156544e6abd6b505ddbb3be2020b		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x283C6 1184 bytes
font_03_cff_off0002b666.bin
452dc947f974f80ab7f3f0d540adb55102b793fbf6333f1eb1c74208a6aab437		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x2B666 6594 bytes

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