Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7f93bad93e6e21a1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

26.3 KB Created: 2010-05-18 00:45:49 -03:00 Authoring application: PrimoPDF http://www.primopdf.com (via Nitro PDF PrimoPDF) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: a4a3eaa3bc4d6e1fcb7bc386f2846d9d SHA-1: 7926b84c1bbc22f4a1cc6ce3f94942e2da11def7 SHA-256: 7f93bad93e6e21a13343b161b32ad3d030718e2c17c2954b2abfd8aee8c8b618
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains JavaScript that utilizes the `exportDataObject` function to drop and launch an embedded Windows executable disguised as 'corrupteddata.pdf'. The critical heuristic CVE_2010_1240 indicates that the PDF leverages a launch action to execute 'cmd.exe', which in turn is likely responsible for running the dropped payload. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Rozena-24, suggesting a downloader or trojan.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\corrupteddata.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.primopdf.com In PDF document text
    • http://www.primopdf.com)/Author(crzsk8erIn PDF document text
    • tcp://79.129.137.48:7777In extracted file (corrupteddata.pdf)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
corrupteddata.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 18 at offset 0x1827 37888 bytes
SHA-256: c9550e244d96063c9aed88060aba51ca9b2f9784a5ba4928c0a209a4f9e80ef7
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-24
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=corrupteddata.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 79.129.137.48:7777 (reverse/x86, public) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0019_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 19 at offset 0x6509 62 bytes
SHA-256: 3f0bad9d72ae01d539c888b14c6fc2d71da5a5f2ef1a8ae806c8ee2347569a2b
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "corrupteddata", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off000006ba.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6BA 6372 bytes
SHA-256: f923d0be2241783bc0af543e68632b118efae9ba31bfba4f67d9fb9f2dd668f0

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