Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9f16bdf476fe2073…

MALICIOUS

PDF

38.5 KB Created: 2010-01-28 17:27:39 +01:00 Authoring application: 376377000P000D000F000C000r000e000a000t000o000r000 000V000e000r000s000i000o000n000 0000000.0009000.0008 (via GPL Ghostscript 8.64)
MD5: 4e18edd4101868706cad0c00f2341be1 SHA-1: d8f053f9eaa4d31498f6491ebc9f45e83fdd952d SHA-256: 9f16bdf476fe207312a540eadcfc1f84be364cf9ae370a517b5c81ecdcba2841
484 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a launch action that targets cmd.exe, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands. The critical heuristic 'PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD' confirms that a Windows executable is embedded and disguised as '1.pdf'. This executable payload is detected by ClamAV as 'Win.Trojan.Rozena-131', and the PDF itself is detected as 'Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586'. The attack pattern involves exploiting CVE-2010-1240 to achieve code execution and drop a secondary payload.

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\1.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
1.pdf
42fdfc6af0fbdb832d5a8cb2f530e6aca480aa6b39f033552f4dcda0de36cd9f		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 33 at offset 0x4983 37888 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0034_000.js
6a59dd3b366f3db80f454a191b81fd87c67c56e15006b58e6d6da19c8de4eb77		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 34 at offset 0x9661 50 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00001503.bin
51f979b47e732f1ac3ddf5cdef81cf2c7672e61e7dbc492acf0f83ef95609d6b		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1503 5784 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00002379.bin
216c570970cfb375d8634c26e768ccea5845bc6d6c35e297a239269b4c4cee7c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2379 5476 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00003101.bin
33fab8473cba24967590f4fcaf0b7f4ab8d14acd0cdfa8cd3b7369a9e20b7023		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3101 6688 bytes

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