Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c22d6c60b0ede9c6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

702.2 KB Created: >?[ïÁ|:m„V®g™ªB2 þ°$ Authoring application: ;f°“)~yå'ÙKËþ 9éæl}œ÷…‹ (via ;f°“)~yñ ì*CÌ÷k ÷®2/”ñ™‹Öyx) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: dc477a3d357506c3a8c220c280e5a750 SHA-1: c30029fa49d3493cbe56223eb2e72ccb32fb43fb SHA-256: c22d6c60b0ede9c670b772148831006b39eb4072de628914a8e716b5975b5ef8
616 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the exportDataObject API to launch cmd.exe. This action is intended to execute a second-stage payload, identified as a Windows executable by ClamAV and static triage, which is disguised as 'manual.pdf'. The embedded URL suggests a local listener for C2 communication.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9948

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\manual.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Encrypted PDF carries /JavaScript — payload hidden from static analysis high PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JS
    PDF declares /Encrypt and also references an executable trigger (/JavaScript). Document encryption hides the JavaScript body and stream contents from static scanners — combined with auto-execution indicators this is a known evasion pattern used to deliver weaponised JavaScript that the analyst cannot inspect without the decryption key.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL tcp://127.0.0.1:4444 In extracted file (manual.pdf)
🗂 Part of campaign: shared payload 76595334d2 3 samples

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
manual.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 29 at offset 0x27C0 61440 bytes
SHA-256: 4555485d0337e7bd88f123b07209a71fffe3f5af87f0894a79ce4aaa1c8f58c2
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=manual.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 127.0.0.1:4444 (reverse/x86, placeholder) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress, CreateFileA, kernel32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, CreateProcessA
javascript_obj0005_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 5 at offset 0x129F 55 bytes
SHA-256: 76595334d20f64533a1f0fc82533236aed103be28220cf87b9da87a3d9cbf07f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "manual", nLaunch: 0 });

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.