Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 838cfbd688326df9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

60.6 KB Created: 2012-07-05 17:07:19 +09:00 Authoring application: Microsoft® Office Word 2007 First seen: 2013-09-27
MD5: 74ba430de3b56778414ea72351683b2f SHA-1: 764fe63b04c98d92e0c0c9ebb57e75a8d74aab4e SHA-256: 838cfbd688326df95cb6ec69a2f8819ced85fbc8ef192b336a2d7ae57fe05c73
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. The command line parameters indicate an attempt to execute an embedded file named 'hello.pdf', which is actually a Windows executable. This executable is likely responsible for downloading and executing a further stage payload, as suggested by the embedded URL and the ClamAV detection of a trojan.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\hello.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (hello.pdf)
    • tcp://127.0.0.1:4444In extracted file (hello.pdf)
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CSPCA.crl0HIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000007a6.bin)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CSPCA.crt0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000007a6.bin)
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0HIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000007a6.bin)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000007a6.bin)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typographyIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000007a6.bin)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
hello.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 21 at offset 0x40D1 73802 bytes
SHA-256: d6f50e045f7b7d0f878db71718af69a008b86e16ec334b3a04d7f3fd64f02d48
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=hello.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 127.0.0.1:4444 (reverse/x86, placeholder) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0022_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 22 at offset 0xEDB3 54 bytes
SHA-256: 9fa449ae07b35544186247aadfc797edb30acb5bd6d2424c3114dc06ec5e528d
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "hello", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off000007a6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7A6 414188 bytes
SHA-256: a841b062cd8a39530939b08fc4b912e9e1da4c7a33a5c91c395ebda0075bf22e

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