Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b34574ad855918cc…

MALICIOUS

PDF

47.4 KB Created: 2014-02-06 13:59:32 +01:00 Authoring application: Microsoft® Word 2010 First seen: 2026-05-04
MD5: 7c9733bfd71471c4d137e5d549d79f90 SHA-1: a4a298b19bcb3c523b0789f3e51fedaad69f1e0f SHA-256: b34574ad855918cce393ded9b211fb9a39d3fa03b94e26b61257d6d4ba88c255
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that uses the `exportDataObject` function to launch an executable disguised as 'dokument.pdf'. This executable is detected as a Windows Trojan by ClamAV. The PDF also contains a launch action for 'cmd.exe', indicating an attempt to execute commands, likely to run the embedded payload. The URL http://www.zeustech.net/ is associated with the embedded JavaScript, suggesting a potential command and control or download source.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\dokument.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (dokument.pdf)
    • tcp://127.0.0.1:53In extracted file (dokument.pdf)
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
dokument.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 20 at offset 0xC4A 73802 bytes
SHA-256: 96d28e189c67c9d86947d0a9c5a213d2245e7f9e59905d2a203e46b88582ce6b
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=dokument.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 127.0.0.1:53 (reverse/x86, placeholder) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0021_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 21 at offset 0xB869 57 bytes
SHA-256: 724a37c707dfa84e9e83756b7628fd74d494f4e975e8c2ab40b6d31e6a7b17c7
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "dokument", nLaunch: 0 });