Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6c1a8fe213f6bce5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

425.5 KB Created: 2011-07-21 14:19:36 Authoring application: Microsoft® Office Word 2007 First seen: 2012-10-29
MD5: bab56d94ff845995d9e19d2f91cd9746 SHA-1: 6649d9c5e7db47ee394aab1445a2660f86cfb451 SHA-256: 6c1a8fe213f6bce56033b26313517a8cc43b553c7d48af325ad0842a088d8df9
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the 'exportDataObject' function to launch cmd.exe. The command executed by cmd.exe is 'start crono1p.pdf', which is intended to execute the embedded Windows executable disguised as 'crono1p.pdf'. This executable was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0, indicating a malicious payload delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9973

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\crono1p.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (crono1p.pdf)
    • tcp://192.168.200.2:4455In extracted file (crono1p.pdf)
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CSPCA.crl0HIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0002497f.bin)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CSPCA.crt0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0002497f.bin)
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0HIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0002497f.bin)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0002497f.bin)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typographyIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0002497f.bin)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/In extracted file (font_03_sfnt_off00042b2c.bin)

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
crono1p.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 3542 at offset 0x5F467 73802 bytes
SHA-256: d3db0268a5ccf375a4d9ad8b7114a18b9a35dc6f072447bea71d405158a928a1
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=crono1p.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.200.2:4455 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj3543_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 3543 at offset 0x6A0E1 56 bytes
SHA-256: 6315c161bdcbb40e620936585c46efff48f8b9ad485738715a50a077bcaa8e1b
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "crono1p", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off0002497f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2497F 179764 bytes
SHA-256: f2e2ff7f9b4ec6b043cfff06ee4c4d671aa4089008133f5ed0b64c478aff15ee
font_01_sfnt_off0002ed15.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2ED15 178488 bytes
SHA-256: c59fc64203534b8b1babf698a8e4c3e4d4013f9ead2140e9c6e05863930d4c10
font_02_sfnt_off00038efc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x38EFC 183784 bytes
SHA-256: b5d7b14b917f3b13638d6e09227f0b8ff7004dd8a5f8a24bbc204842e64603d6
font_03_sfnt_off00042b2c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x42B2C 44304 bytes
SHA-256: 9cb6958e34909523099f6588beac98a49bc7432dd25fbe95b14bf6011ceec307
font_04_sfnt_off00045703.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x45703 57800 bytes
SHA-256: dd7a488c965c692d780e31096e2615e1c067897fea0d8c7b02468e13394e3bc0
font_05_sfnt_off0004998e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4998E 50216 bytes
SHA-256: d07475a70ed223e0123b0535165cebf095acd70ce00e0ed69cc68596f9d35c59