Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9deb4a20321897aa…

MALICIOUS

PDF

290.8 KB Created: 2009-02-26 11:40:43 +01:00 Authoring application: Acrobat Distiller 7.0.5 pour Macintosh
MD5: aa9914dc4f7765955007292034906b48 SHA-1: ae064741ac13e9f60a0c209cdf2bdbe50470beb8 SHA-256: 9deb4a20321897aa5a12458fcf31bfd00ba2a9a146519d5569d9cefac86c685e
432 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file leverages a known vulnerability (CVE-2010-1240) to execute cmd.exe. It contains an embedded Windows executable disguised as a PDF file named 'a.pdf'. The embedded JavaScript further facilitates the launch action, indicating a dropper mechanism designed to execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\a.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • ASCII85Decode filter (with exploit indicators) low PDF_FILTER_85
    ASCII85 encoding filter present alongside exploit delivery indicators — uncommon outside of obfuscation
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
a.pdf
4d9f1b7e9d7edf58f40fbb5036bc5d0ef20069fa6332f9557f81fc637c2e17b6		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 48 at offset 0x3DA88 73802 bytes
javascript_obj0049_000.js
3505343638f6dc9858d159b020c197aaba8da7d8ae890f622c0c584ff15672cf		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 49 at offset 0x4870F 50 bytes
font_00_cff_off000104a5.bin
c87ec1f1686634d8c79c2e2872e74b8e9f58ce1ba845330313087080f19b07a5		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x104A5 18980 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00014397.bin
77eec9bf9c231f6fb5f6aa8549cee2d1d309ce4272add76ad00151a83c53dba9		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14397 71520 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0002103b.bin
8987abfcce34661b040dca065f92a854d0cad7fe8738a48954b38aa51b216749		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2103B 64560 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off0002cb93.bin
921c39e80c9530e54a7e7b29ae8afc4f7ac6fbf09c679c934b62716405dd009d		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2CB93 73516 bytes
font_04_sfnt_off0003a383.bin
136fe83ec498e745360a593f0e8660b07687a4521b1389746f837a775f998efd		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3A383 12856 bytes

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