Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 76da429fc4ac0045…

MALICIOUS

PDF

47.6 KB Created: 2011-04-18 15:20:20 +08:00 Authoring application: xyghPDF SDK 4.3 (via BCL easyPDF 4.30 (0615))
MD5: f7ed441b9059a893390ae53df4925d14 SHA-1: 322175865868643831651f38abc7195a787fd966 SHA-256: 76da429fc4ac0045de234b3c2f4fee01be46cca220d2ada1cff1fb72783be08e
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The PDF file contains embedded Flash content that exploits CVE-2011-0611, a known vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player. This exploit is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of multiple PDF-related heuristics, including embedded files and a flagged child PDF, further supports the malicious nature of this document. No document body text was available for analysis, but the exploit and embedded artifacts are sufficient for a high-confidence assessment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9817

Heuristics 7

  • Adobe Flash Player RichMedia exploit critical CVE likely CVE_2011_0611_FLASH_RICHMEDIA
    PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation with an embedded AS3 SWF loader (ByteArray/loadBytes) and shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static exploit shape associated with CVE-2011-0611 Flash content delivered through Adobe Reader.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objstm_0026_00.bin
0841ed6ca2149b386133777ff3868f6222ba5033d6f52cd654a117610818bd40
pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 26 0 obj (inflated) 1084 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000a335.pdf
4044524e0d63e7a8080f48c5c2ac2d90f174bca6a94b7529f245da6d43f70bcf
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0xA335 6976 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000a688.pdf
0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0xA688 6125 bytes