Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d8bab83419f6fd61…

MALICIOUS

PDF

131.3 KB Created: 2008-10-29 09:36:06 +08:00 Authoring application: xyghPDF SDK 4.3 (via BCL easyPDF 4.30 (0615)) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 2ac243b6052980592ab670b9bb4ec847 SHA-1: 0a6cd5d9f0a856d23091aa51df60b518e48d046e SHA-256: d8bab83419f6fd61e301beee14ca977d57667d9c3adfa200ae6bed6ba3190f74
290 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious Attachment T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF sample contains embedded JavaScript and triggers the CVE-2009-4324 vulnerability, indicating an attempt to exploit PDF reader software. The presence of JavaScript actions and unescape calls, along with a secondary embedded PDF, suggests a multi-stage attack. The primary goal appears to be the execution of malicious code via the identified exploit.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9963

Heuristics 8

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    var sc =  unescape(urpl("%Zc8d9%Z74d9%Zf424%Zeeba%Ze0ec%Z29dc%Z5fc9%Z37b1%Z5731%Z8314%Z1001%Z2402%Z4207%Zdce0%Z55ee%Zdce4%Zecee%Zb8bf%Zdc4f%Zdce0%Z67ee%Zd0a0%Z9c65%Z71fc%Z8465%Z8de8%Z9965%Z57dc%Zc29a%Zdf98%Zba1b%Zaa6b%Zefce%Zef15%Za527%Z71a1%Z29ed%Z07d3%Z52e1%Ze4f0%Z981c%Z1de8%Ze125%Z06e3%Z07ae%Ze711%Z99f1%Z8207%Zb265%Zdfc4%Z8a33%Zd06b%Z67a5%Zc0be%Z31ed%Zd86b%Zef65%Z7725%Z0eb7%Zef5c%Z6f35%Zd823%Zec84%Z23b3%Z10b9%Zdbdb%Z1f9b%Z8369%Z7512%Z8eb2%Z9b11%Z23e4%Z1099%Z8b1f%Z7516%Z9c8a%Zec86%Zdcf0%Z13ee% …
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_002_off00000329.js decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x329 2684 bytes
SHA-256: 07366e0d11ea2d380093c6549e4fcbdadab1a0df22cf234853e0bf2c4a75a70c
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long hex-escaped blob(s).
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js string-concatenation normalized Acrobat API aliases at offset 0x329 126 bytes
SHA-256: 42c3f4df375ff6f58ff655cc4f88b5cc28f0dd33b978390db3538684a6219b74
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
media.newPlayer(null); /* AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA */
objstm_0024_00.bin pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 24 0 obj (inflated) 332 bytes
SHA-256: 5e33c5e97bbc41469ea4328ae48aa20389a4ed5a4c9608e42a4e56b7bc98859c
polyglot_child_pdf_off0001f1f5.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x1F1F5 6976 bytes
SHA-256: 4044524e0d63e7a8080f48c5c2ac2d90f174bca6a94b7529f245da6d43f70bcf
polyglot_child_pdf_off0001f548.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x1F548 6125 bytes
SHA-256: 0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8

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