Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 75c82a23dc32599e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

60.2 KB Authoring application: cairo 1.7.4 (http://cairographics.org
MD5: e31fa3cad0df6ba8c914ad336286b044 SHA-1: 139d3dfed4130271744fbec24ba8dbe997947954 SHA-256: 75c82a23dc32599eb96b067f7634f21a2c4753020b6c43fe022b61ed367569ba
496 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. This command is designed to run an embedded Windows executable, disguised as 'CERT.pdf'. The embedded executable is the primary payload, and the PDF serves as a dropper and execution vector.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9970

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\CERT.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://cairographics.org
    • https://www.cert.fnmt.es/index.php?cha=cit&sec=

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
CERT.pdf
e069258f3cbacfce342eac8cc12e8d29e424bc1b38de25afa8be9c1cd542a00e		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 79 at offset 0xE033 6144 bytes
javascript_obj0080_000.js
48f002757bb1149f285b33ef58e1d8c5d925587504f2a656ecae55cd69d2e934		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 80 at offset 0xEC48 53 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000535d.bin
f2ac10d774e90f72ae9f4aa777687f83b43f06d67748f9ae0157c8dc2a46aaf6		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x535D 17540 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00008b37.bin
6ba22241d625180804e5739fe8b15654fc419f6f4145547d89d45a7fe0796101		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8B37 12760 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000b4f4.bin
a32b39d84cd00316a81b2b8906adcafc5fa38186e019b43dbd980d8dcc236637		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB4F4 10760 bytes

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