Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5b764fc1a2363b6d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

109.2 KB Authoring application: cairo 1.7.4 (http://cairographics.org
MD5: 0ab8bf3dc3be05e48f15943aa4cd9866 SHA-1: 075679c373175e3a6633479a0b67ddbceb57d8fb SHA-256: 5b764fc1a2363b6d5ecc53ab61d2fc24227e79fe78bf447f4459688c1ad2b4d1
496 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that triggers a launch action, exploiting CVE-2010-1240 to execute cmd.exe. The command executed attempts to run a payload disguised as 'test.pdf', indicating a dropper functionality. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly support its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9978

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: Cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\test.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://cairographics.org
    • http://laramies.blogspot.com/2009/04/meterpreter

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
test.pdf
d99025bd25af8ab78d97269d81f00b8de749b5e7e7fd064c278b80d4d8e59e9b		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 95 at offset 0x199E8 18144 bytes
javascript_obj0096_000.js
b1a09f919e0f5d1c1d284849c9af93bae6fd1411634dfdc491e126f9cd327f3f		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 96 at offset 0x1B086 53 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000a47c.bin
ffa975e444309aebf63087f3372274e1fd05a3b85a460f0c6a855bdc7113c769		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA47C 12956 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000cf57.bin
2851bc3374b9c02cc1131d2e60acd2be985d12500167557e434aea7b813ffea5		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCF57 23504 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00011762.bin
716a68784192bd9b2407ec84c2b43eea85b119a8f83097233f5b893eff7601f2		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11762 16892 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off00014d10.bin
661b5ab8b79bed39fb077069230bed3c4fef1ec7b66f26711c6735d5964187ab		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14D10 10680 bytes
font_04_sfnt_off00017024.bin
774840a6a84af5d7c37f05ceef2629c139a9eca873339dd9e3b1226aa5487008		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x17024 4488 bytes
font_05_sfnt_off000181df.bin
257507ce0ea20492f410111dbfa2e235e1ad6f7edab9fec531ae3412c661965e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x181DF 3820 bytes

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