Malicious PDF / .EXE — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f2d0e4b4188bc38a…

MALICIOUS

PDF / .EXE

404.3 KB Authoring application: cairo 1.7.4 (http://cairographics.org
MD5: 6cba773300163be58ba661e8b0a3d33e SHA-1: b9f0bc0d6f29542e1ff92c40e1aef8d7dc15901d SHA-256: f2d0e4b4188bc38a3cc6600e7dfb3b3c6ec70f302de5969b6add6b584d949b75
466 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a launch action that executes cmd.exe. This action is designed to exploit CVE-2010-1240, allowing the execution of an embedded Windows executable payload. The embedded executable is masqueraded as 'zeus.pdf' but is detected as a malicious PE file. The script likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\zeus.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Visible LOLBin command execution instruction high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Document contains instructions or visible command text involving Windows script/execution tools such as PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, or regsvr32
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://cairographics.org

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
zeus.pdf
3aae2e19872718d0479c343217ae7abfca52c0a510e24d9ae7eaa892fb111268		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 368 at offset 0x57815 64000 bytes
javascript_obj0369_000.js
7c316aa682776aac578b7b0e99333118e1141bfbc8e279449ece6ee015d3002a		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 369 at offset 0x64C75 53 bytes
stream_082_off0002b18f.bin
a7d72eb965eb9574262338ebb1ecc94e9aab7663f57c8498a91cdf0f6e7c5d1c		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x2B18F 97566 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.76, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
font_00_sfnt_off00050f44.bin
ff2ec4872c0d42cdc1db359eb34db919be23303362278401f307e50ea9f4cff5		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x50F44 12284 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0005387b.bin
99fab0b04b723b96179d7ddbd58e90fc51b76a4b66c2109e0c79c447af0fa023		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5387B 9392 bytes

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