Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6e6c1eee9d2a8508…

MALICIOUS

PDF

877.4 KB Created: 2013-06-19 18:22:53 Authoring application: convertonlinefree.com
MD5: 8d1b496f91c106c1a35abac422c749c0 SHA-1: d3679d4a4d5e027b988e99877a8c1c609380ae2b SHA-256: 6e6c1eee9d2a8508c92a8e2189089ec967f5114756191812ef50cc9f17d29959
678 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. The command line parameters suggest it attempts to execute a payload named 'tutorial.pdf' which is actually a Windows executable. This executable is likely a downloader for a second-stage payload, as indicated by the embedded URL and the ClamAV detection on the extracted artifact. The exploit cluster and CVE-2023-26369 related findings point to a known PDF exploitation technique.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9925

Heuristics 17

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED
    PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\tutorial.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • Clickable URI uses URL shortener medium PDF_URL_SHORTENER_URI
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose destination is a URL shortener. This hides the final landing page from static review and is common in phishing redirect PDFs.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://lineagehack.blogger.com.br/
    • http://lineagehack.blogger.com.br
    • http://www.zeustech.net/
    • http://]hostname[:port]/path
    • http://bit.ly/cp-reloader
    • http://lineage2.free.fr/IMG/jpg/Lineage_II_c4_Map_Plus_v3.jpg
    • http://www.apache.org/
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://fontfabrik.comYou
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspx
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicCodSigPCA_08-31-2010.crl0Z
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicCodSigPCA_08-31-2010.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crl0X
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microsoftrootcert.crl0T
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftRootCert.crt0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
tutorial.pdf
d9b7ec72eafefb26af89b0f69ed3fadfd0055a6c35ee4e94e07dbb9951218073		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 111 at offset 0xCFE6E 73802 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Exploit.Call4_Dword_Xor-1
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0112_000.js
aa59aace8f4fcb245791590040f35af0e61ac400e7b31e58047425baaa23d5e2		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 112 at offset 0xDB08F 57 bytes
stream_037_off000b7591.bin
8407706f99245e4f28e676a26061fa5b7f170ebbb486a5241516379e72e7cd27		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xB7591 203972 bytes

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