Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ef391db8eafbaec8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

832.9 KB Created: 2013-06-19 18:22:53 Authoring application: convertonlinefree.com
MD5: 5bce579d7a1cb64ad995a66c9d0ccc30 SHA-1: fc22100387e45fad19086420b92009cb4cca3572 SHA-256: ef391db8eafbaec8e792f291046298a480d9eb70d418cfb45f6ba8df5b8cb443
406 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a launch action that targets cmd.exe, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands. The critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND and CVE_2010_1240 heuristics confirm this exploit vector. The embedded JavaScript and the PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS heuristic suggest the script is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of the URL http://lineagehack.blogger.com.br/ further supports the malicious intent, likely as a command and control or download source.

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED
    PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\tutorial.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • Clickable URI uses URL shortener medium PDF_URL_SHORTENER_URI
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose destination is a URL shortener. This hides the final landing page from static review and is common in phishing redirect PDFs.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://lineagehack.blogger.com.br/
    • http://bit.ly/cp-reloader
    • http://lineage2.free.fr/IMG/jpg/Lineage_II_c4_Map_Plus_v3.jpg

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0112_000.js
aa59aace8f4fcb245791590040f35af0e61ac400e7b31e58047425baaa23d5e2
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 112 at offset 0xCFE7E 57 bytes
stream_037_off000b7591.bin
8407706f99245e4f28e676a26061fa5b7f170ebbb486a5241516379e72e7cd27
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xB7591 203972 bytes