Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cf8af03d25dc9401…

MALICIOUS

PDF

385.6 KB Created: 2012-05-10 22:18:44 +02:00 Authoring application: Microsoft® Word 2010
MD5: c0845766f6b9d0395e185e8e6c99e890 SHA-1: 70b0fd38007ed97d6bc72d79728c4ddce7d09c28 SHA-256: cf8af03d25dc94015d6cc8e98d95456e99e6fe57b1ddd5e0a163bdd6e7a479b6
410 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a PE payload, and triggers a launch action for cmd.exe. This indicates an attempt to exploit a vulnerability, likely CVE-2010-1240, to execute arbitrary code. The embedded executable and the associated URL suggest the document is a lure to download and run a secondary malicious payload. The ClamAV detection further confirms its malicious nature.

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED
    PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\!Infected_PDF_File_WARNING!!!.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • PDF differential parser failed info PDF_DIFFERENTIAL_PARSE_FAILED
    The cross-check parser (pdfminer.six) failed on this file: PDF differential parser exited 1. Static heuristics still ran and any of their findings above are valid; only the differential cross-check signal is missing.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://blog.snypter.com/2011/10/adobe-pdf-embedded-exe-exploit-for-xp-systems/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0065_000.js
55fd770131edfae6dad9cfc3bf2e6daf23ccc9be8bed99a6bfd99922e422c9ab
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 65 at offset 0x600D0 78 bytes
stream_004_off000176d0.bin
5c1d9757cab5cca7cc965b4f77b6c89ea1cf0f3961157e2d387840caf852e0a5
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x176D0 188552 bytes
stream_009_off00055458.bin
a1386d99ecca30ee93312680ff03c2c219cc3970c1b37209995ef7951fa8429c
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x55458 73802 bytes