Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 15

• Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
  PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
• TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED
  PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
• ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7265450-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7265450-0
• Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
  PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
• Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
  PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
• /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
  PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\malo.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
• Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
  An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
• Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
  PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
  PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
  PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
• Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
  PDF has 1 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 273 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
• Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
  PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript

  • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (malo.pdf)
  • tcp://10.0.2.15:4444In extracted file (malo.pdf)
  • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://lucasfonts.comMicrosoftIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000176b5.bin)
  • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_LicenseIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000176b5.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspxIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000176b5.bin)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crl0XIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000176b5.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crt0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000176b5.bin)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicCodSigPCA_08-31-2010.crl0ZIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000176b5.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicCodSigPCA_08-31-2010.crt0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000176b5.bin)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microsoftrootcert.crl0TIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000176b5.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftRootCert.crt0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000176b5.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/Typography/0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000176b5.bin)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.