MALICIOUS
536
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1059.007 JavaScript
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The PDF file contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. This command is used to export and attempt to launch an embedded executable file named 'x.pdf', which is detected as a Windows executable by ClamAV. The embedded JavaScript and the launch action targeting cmd.exe indicate a clear intent to execute a second-stage payload.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000
Heuristics 12
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Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
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ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
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Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
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Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
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/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMANDPDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\x.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
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Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCHAn /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
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/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JSPDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
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Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (x.pdf)
- http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00001792.bin)
- http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_arial.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00001792.bin)
Extracted artifacts 4
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
x.pdf |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 145 at offset 0xEF0F | 73802 bytes |
SHA-256: 4cb203ee923b5ad6e04dadf9cd6cd85331ca46e423e18d55d51b09db919f470f |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Exploit.Call4_Dword_Xor-1
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=x.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
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javascript_obj0146_000.js |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 146 at offset 0x1895E | 50 bytes |
SHA-256: c0ed4ae8fb1195de29a24391d08f82ea298c9484c1bfbc5668f9a83bc86dc1e2 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "x", nLaunch: 0 });
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font_00_sfnt_off00001792.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1792 | 30032 bytes |
SHA-256: 9cf44bf735229b5bf7a883c2d392cd7d6f54da0f55bda93b30855ed747fb503b |
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font_01_sfnt_off00005e8f.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5E8F | 37220 bytes |
SHA-256: b3ec765c09493ccd02f617aad756d1f7c1f58419ccc4b17c967f4eb54cd2371e |
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