Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 60888a224195f357…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.3 KB Created: 2010-08-11 14:04:09 -03:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.2)
MD5: 3b68db984bc57a0a0d677c38313a654d SHA-1: 7106585d04294355f2e0a6d30b0fd002b956ca84 SHA-256: 60888a224195f3571d6947844ed8f5da08dbf980e75dbb2c727ea0e82a058f70
516 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the `exportDataObject` function, which is known to be used for launching embedded executables. This is further supported by critical heuristics indicating a PDF launch action targeting `cmd.exe` and an embedded PE payload. The embedded JavaScript likely facilitates the execution of the dropped payload, which is disguised as 'x.pdf' but identified as a Windows executable by ClamAV. The presence of `cmd.exe` in the launch parameters and the embedded executable strongly suggest an exploit chain aimed at executing arbitrary code.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\x.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/
    • http://]hostname[:port]/path
    • http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.html
    • http://www.apache.org/
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_arial.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATION

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
x.pdf
4cb203ee923b5ad6e04dadf9cd6cd85331ca46e423e18d55d51b09db919f470f		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 145 at offset 0xEF0F 73802 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Exploit.Call4_Dword_Xor-1
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0146_000.js
c0ed4ae8fb1195de29a24391d08f82ea298c9484c1bfbc5668f9a83bc86dc1e2		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 146 at offset 0x1895E 50 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00005e8f.bin
b3ec765c09493ccd02f617aad756d1f7c1f58419ccc4b17c967f4eb54cd2371e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5E8F 37220 bytes

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