Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5ff503959d56ff21…

MALICIOUS

PDF

998.2 KB Created: 2016-09-01 23:10:37 +03:00 Authoring application: Microsoft® Word 2016
MD5: 8f0868675187abe80500a6b6a4af51e1 SHA-1: 45700f9df9f93ff5fb75b9e509d254b4e0234219 SHA-256: 5ff503959d56ff21f140dce31935860aa33e87446f71ec4af8a8f46743ee383c
658 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. This action is designed to export an embedded Windows executable, masquerading as 'Traps.pdf', which was detected as malware by ClamAV. The exploit leverages CVE-2010-1240 and potentially CVE-2023-26369, indicating a sophisticated attack aimed at delivering a malicious payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9952

Heuristics 16

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED
    PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\Traps.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/
    • http://]hostname[:port]/path
    • http://www.paloaltonetworks.com/
    • https://intranet.paloaltonetworks.com/docs/DOC-22281
    • https://intranet.paloaltonetworks.com/docs/DOC-18100?sr=stream
    • https://intranet.paloaltonetworks.com/docs/DOC-22299
    • https://intranet.paloaltonetworks.com/docs/DOC-23738
    • https://intranet.paloaltonetworks.com/docs/DOC-
    • https://intranet.paloaltonetworks.com/docs/DOC-23739
    • http://www.apache.org/
    • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_License
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crl0X
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicCodSigPCA_08-31-2010.crl0Z
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicCodSigPCA_08-31-2010.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microsoftrootcert.crl0T
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftRootCert.crt0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/Typography/0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://fontfabrik.comYou
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspx
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://www.fonts.comYou
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/0

Extracted artifacts 10

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
Traps.pdf
1ae1657540bfb6fba610062fd75d784af7bcd0cc57274cc62f9eff684c41f04a		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 1519 at offset 0xEE6E9 73802 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj1520_000.js
62604d34bbfd236c236e30650c33981bf6906d7b14c49eb2a92141aad2ec2c3b		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1520 at offset 0xF9316 54 bytes
stream_034_off00022345.bin
9e074e8a363dc69f1a22cd68409cb686b58a2675ee645b2e9b38a64640d477db		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x22345 311464 bytes
stream_035_off0003a2d0.bin
a74ec457822a006f9531b27b4356b2b451efc72ff00235ffa88ba40af600f62c		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x3A2D0 168928 bytes
stream_037_off0004d64a.bin
2103d8e76f51c045054039f7b867860c3bd5cc3aaeb948e3df2990ba6f92e45e		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x4D64A 264856 bytes
stream_039_off0006dab5.bin
3f1fefd30cccc32a8cd9842385bc151f8d03ed8815075dac59424187a35c3c62		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x6DAB5 221432 bytes
stream_040_off00087de8.bin
4532dfb94118fc043df5b69d95f375ed8d6322f2462e752fe18194c46cd64b70		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x87DE8 217380 bytes
stream_044_off000aaa16.bin
190cf028419c41261546098871fe88fa4887f92b689557216afcef0d9e5fce9b		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xAAA16 94144 bytes
stream_047_off000b7f5b.bin
24dfc4d66662202ffa33734291ce62c1f4ce4b02d03555de0fc52b9aa5165478		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xB7F5B 217128 bytes
stream_048_off000d158c.bin
f6d8cf7987a03b927cdb1d19fe749dde4c2468673eb031442051263db2bf83a4		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xD158C 271876 bytes

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