MALICIOUS
624
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1059.007 JavaScript
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The PDF file contains JavaScript that attempts to export a data object named 'test'. This action is paired with a PDF launch action that executes 'cmd.exe', indicating an attempt to exploit CVE-2010-1240 to execute a payload. The embedded artifact 'test.pdf' was identified as a Windows executable, further confirming the malicious intent to deliver and execute a secondary payload.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999
Heuristics 14
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Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
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ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
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Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
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Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
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/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMANDPDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\test.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
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Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCHAn /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
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Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JSPDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
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Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASIONPDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
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JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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External URI low PDF_URIPDF contains an external URL action
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (test.pdf)
- tcp://192.168.147.142:257In extracted file (test.pdf)
- http://www.afterdawn.com/glossary/terms/conditional_access_module.cfmPDF link annotation
- http://www.afterdawn.com/glossary/terms/conditional_access_system.cfmIn PDF document text
- http://www.afterdawn.com/glossary/terms/conditional_access_module.cfm)endobj19In PDF document text
- http://www.afterdawn.com/glossary/terms/conditional_access_system.cfm)endobj9In PDF document text
- http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off0000b62a.icc)
Extracted artifacts 7
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
test.pdf |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 52 at offset 0x18031 | 73802 bytes |
SHA-256: b85f240d8964eda2cd82ef52ee4d8f428b2c5cec0340ac0499c7203044c6b0bf |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=test.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.147.142:257 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_REVERSE, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
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javascript_obj0053_000.js |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 53 at offset 0x22CB3 | 53 bytes |
SHA-256: b1a09f919e0f5d1c1d284849c9af93bae6fd1411634dfdc491e126f9cd327f3f |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "test", nLaunch: 0 });
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stream_007_off0000d99c.bin |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xD99C | 28748 bytes |
SHA-256: 7af40e8778d002cc3fc1564a190e9d8643f068cefd9cf1da8934adac4b2837f7 |
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icc_00_off0000b62a.icc |
pdf-icc-profile | PDF ICC profile at offset 0xB62A | 3144 bytes |
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e |
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icc_01_off0000c0ff.icc |
pdf-icc-profile | PDF ICC profile at offset 0xC0FF | 4380 bytes |
SHA-256: bad673993556e6b0887d39ea77607649277a6ccaa6a2d454ec077dad52adc122 |
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font_01_sfnt_off00012d08.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12D08 | 6780 bytes |
SHA-256: 6e28b485e52e02cd3776de5f6910482cd52337d749fddb0c950b554f588e8167 |
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font_02_sfnt_off000141cf.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x141CF | 19520 bytes |
SHA-256: 918283255c3352ee70016b40338614216d29cc719387b49bfbfecb255d021109 |
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