Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5cb7aadf96f07a4d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

49.1 KB Created: Friday, February 14, 1997 3:59:34 PM Authoring application: simple.fm (via Acrobat PDFWriter 3.0 for Windows) First seen: 2015-10-06
MD5: 336de982f02eab609b15d3bada315ba0 SHA-1: 79c705d99799e5d118b6b4f794769755f153f373 SHA-256: 5cb7aadf96f07a4d22d842b236481c7bc5761d23db404d940898134b62ccc168
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that uses the `exportDataObject` function to launch an embedded executable disguised as 'test.pdf'. This executable is detected as a malicious Windows trojan with reverse TCP shellcode capabilities. The PDF also contains a launch action for 'cmd.exe', indicating exploitation of CVE-2010-1240 to execute arbitrary commands. The embedded JavaScript and the nature of the extracted payload suggest an intent to download and execute a second-stage payload or exfiltrate credentials.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\test.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (test.pdf)
    • tcp://192.168.38.171:4444In extracted file (test.pdf)
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
test.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 29 at offset 0x13B4 73802 bytes
SHA-256: 2ea6148097ba8f6ad6be42d7be98869f89aec44315c27ce178e4d948ccec14f7
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.ShellcodeReverseTcp-1
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=test.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.38.171:4444 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd
javascript_obj0030_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 30 at offset 0xBF76 53 bytes
SHA-256: b1a09f919e0f5d1c1d284849c9af93bae6fd1411634dfdc491e126f9cd327f3f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "test", nLaunch: 0 });

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