Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5cb7aadf96f07a4d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

49.1 KB Created: Friday, February 14, 1997 3:59:34 PM Authoring application: simple.fm (via Acrobat PDFWriter 3.0 for Windows)
MD5: 336de982f02eab609b15d3bada315ba0 SHA-1: 79c705d99799e5d118b6b4f794769755f153f373 SHA-256: 5cb7aadf96f07a4d22d842b236481c7bc5761d23db404d940898134b62ccc168
516 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the exportDataObject function to launch an embedded executable disguised as 'test.pdf'. This executable is then launched via cmd.exe, exploiting CVE-2010-1240. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as a reverse TCP shell.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\test.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/
    • http://]hostname[:port]/path
    • http://www.apache.org/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
test.pdf
2ea6148097ba8f6ad6be42d7be98869f89aec44315c27ce178e4d948ccec14f7		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 29 at offset 0x13B4 73802 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.ShellcodeReverseTcp-1
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0030_000.js
b1a09f919e0f5d1c1d284849c9af93bae6fd1411634dfdc491e126f9cd327f3f		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 30 at offset 0xBF76 53 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.