PDF malware analysis — malicious · e46bbb6d221974f0

MALICIOUS

PDF

108.2 KB Created: 2011-04-01 12:03:11 +02:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word (via Mac OS X 10.4.11 Quartz PDFContext) First seen: 2015-09-18

MD5: 5bbfb6909eb4126edaa842815c807950 SHA-1: 76e936226d6d8f4aa47f97330d8c5184ffc873e5 SHA-256: e46bbb6d221974f00d1d3a0a759399fe901636cbb553cc8d31287d208f92c304

576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

This PDF contains a critical PDF_LAUNCH action targeting cmd.exe, which is part of the CVE-2010-1240 exploit. The exploit chain also involves dropping an embedded Windows executable, disguised as 'test.pdf', which is detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.ShellcodeReverseTcp-1. The embedded JavaScript further supports the dropper functionality.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240

PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH

PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND

PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\test.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH

An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS

PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (test.pdf)
- tcp://192.168.10.11:443In extracted file (test.pdf)
- http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`test.pdf`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 28 at offset 0x100BD	73802 bytes
SHA-256: `1c92aeb45175c4ae8e2a3f361f3ef8dfae1530d67c3695cc6c3c8b07a3b51f42`
Detection ClamAV: Win.Trojan.ShellcodeReverseTcp-1 Obfuscation or payload: likely actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=test.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.10.11:443 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd
`javascript_obj0029_000.js`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 29 at offset 0x1ACB4	53 bytes
SHA-256: `b1a09f919e0f5d1c1d284849c9af93bae6fd1411634dfdc491e126f9cd327f3f`
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script this.exportDataObject({ cName: "test", nLaunch: 0 });
`icc_00_off000029c5.icc`	pdf-icc-profile	PDF ICC profile at offset 0x29C5	1320 bytes
SHA-256: `eb03db58ff1f226c83103a11f30b5520f9b68a7ced67daa78992723e3ea0411d`
`font_00_sfnt_off00002f45.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2F45	40580 bytes
SHA-256: `d1e80cddaf52b191a6785ef8887ccb74dbc83b9730504fa0d04b09c02a190c55`
`font_01_sfnt_off0000a558.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA558	29108 bytes
SHA-256: `a0e656dedc3d993313640993871270ff439f0974df12fd7b7d37476b5a00403a`

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Malware Insights

Machine Learning

Heuristics 12

Related samples 8

Extracted artifacts 5