MALICIOUS
554
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1059.007 JavaScript
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The PDF contains embedded JavaScript that uses the `exportDataObject` function to launch an embedded executable file named 'file.pdf'. This executable is then launched via `cmd.exe` using a PDF launch action, indicating an attempt to execute a malicious payload. The embedded executable was detected as Win.Trojan.Rozena by ClamAV.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9958
Heuristics 15
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Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
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ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
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Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
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Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
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/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMANDPDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\file.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
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Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCHAn /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
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/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JSPDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
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Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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Optional Content Group with action trigger low PDF_OPTIONAL_CONTENTOptional Content Group (layer) co-occurs with an action trigger — content can be selectively hidden from viewers or scanners while the action still fires on open
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Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTONDocument contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
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Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTALThe same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://malwaredatabase.net In PDF document text
- http://openbsd.org)hasIn PDF document text
- http://www.openbsd101.com/installation.htmlIn PDF document text
- http://www.openbsdsupport.org/OpenBSDIn PDF document text
- http://www.thekelleys.org.uk/DNSmasq/In PDF document text
- http://172.20.0.1/wpad.datIn PDF document text
- http://www.samse.fr/GPL/squidclamAV/In PDF document text
- http://172.20.0.1/virus.phpIn PDF document text
- http://127.0.0.1:3128/In PDF document text
- http://rubyurl.com/ZYSLIn PDF document text
- http://www.eicar.orgIn PDF document text
- http://172.20.0.1/virus.php?url=http://www.eicar.org/download/eicar.com&source=172.20.0.200/In PDF document text
- http://www.eicar.org/anti_virus_test_file.htmIn PDF document text
- http://unit2.ca/mal/dll.zipIn PDF document text
- http://172.20.0.1/virus.php?url=http://unit2.ca/mal/dll.zip&source=172.20.0.200/In PDF document text
- http://chaseonline.chase.com.err.com.esIn PDF document text
- http://hgklapla.ns8-wistee.fr/www.PayPal.Com22/webscrcmd=_login-In PDF document text
- http://hgklapla.ns8In PDF document text
- http://unit2.ca/mal/gigaticket2018.exeIn PDF document text
- http://www.bleedingthreats.net/rules/bleedingIn PDF document text
- http://www.lucas-nussbaum.net/blog/?p=168In PDF document text
- http://thomer.com/icmptx/In PDF document text
- http://www.hackinglinuxexposed.com/articles/20030213.htmlIn PDF document text
- http://www.doxpara.com/?p=1185In PDF document text
- http://blog.spoofed.org/2008/07/mitigating-dns-cache-poisoning-with-In PDF document text
- http://www.windowsecurity.com/articles/Phishing-Metamorphosis-2007-Trend-In PDF document text
- http://chaseonline.chase.com.err.com.es/Secure/webform/OSL.aspx?LOB=In PDF document text
- http://www.cyber-ta.orgIn PDF document text
- http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware-In PDF document text
- http://snort2)7.2(c)0.9(.sourceforge.)6.2(n)-0.1(et/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://www.)6.4(thekel)4.1(l)4.1(e)0.3(ys.or)5.3(g)-2.5(.uk/DN)7.4(Smasq/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://)5.4(1)-0.9(72.20.0.1/)5.4(wpad.da)4.7(tReferenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://www.bleedingthreat)5.2(s)-3.5(.)6.1(n)-0.2(et/rules/blee)5.9(d)2.1(ingReferenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://snort2)7(c)1(.sourceforge.)6(net/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://www.)6(thekel)4(l)4(eys.or)5(g)-2(.uk/DN)7(Smasq/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://)5(1)-1(72.20.0.1/)5(wpad.da)5(tReferenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://www.bleedingthreat)5(s)-3(.)6(net/rules/blee)6(d)2(ingReferenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://ocsp.verisign.com0In extracted file (stream_009_off0000a5c4.bin)
- http://www.monotype.comMonotypeIn extracted file (stream_084_off0009b146.bin)
- http://openbsd.orgIn PDF document text
- http://snort2c.sourceforge.net/In PDF document text
- http://www.openbsd.org/faq/pf/authpf.htmlIn PDF document text
- http://chaseonline.chase.comIn PDF document text
- http://paypal.com/secure/OSL.aspx?refer=79238601561In PDF document text
- http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=117497In PDF document text
- http://blog.trendmicro.com/zlob-enters-the-In PDF document text
- http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-08/Feng-Xue/Whitepaper/bh-eu-In PDF document text
- http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1562In PDF document text
- http://blogs.iss.net/archive/dnsnat.htmlIn PDF document text
- http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=565125In PDF document text
+19 more URL(s)
Extracted artifacts 16
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
file.pdf |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 402 at offset 0xE4DEC | 37888 bytes |
SHA-256: bb262130dd9e8b17bf2ea14e09e0c1c85af067cfed9f53a17315e4800cc26481 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=file.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
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javascript_obj0403_000.js |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 403 at offset 0xE9AD1 | 53 bytes |
SHA-256: a51396c74bd43c70b96b2f055287709b214cf3f847ffcb3878ffc071376c425d |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "file", nLaunch: 0 });
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stream_009_off0000a5c4.bin |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xA5C4 | 47052 bytes |
SHA-256: e5ab7a45a3e13c4e4eb82fff2da6b5e8e905a152732627a885f93d3786997015 |
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stream_083_off0008f1a5.bin |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x8F1A5 | 34352 bytes |
SHA-256: f90a10df471862cd0172ff0efb498a252df22508d37edd8b84423d7ea4c8d08d |
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stream_084_off0009b146.bin |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x9B146 | 367112 bytes |
SHA-256: 413c78f91bd39e134f3c0bb204b1d5a90f29df9efddc8fd26950a178058d5d74 |
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icc_00_off0006d831.icc |
pdf-icc-profile | PDF ICC profile at offset 0x6D831 | 3144 bytes |
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e |
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font_00_cff_off00001559.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x1559 | 7446 bytes |
SHA-256: f7e2e9bfafd0652df5839d9c26f59ab9990bb39896d6712f61b38dc370e7c5f2 |
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font_01_cff_off00002f84.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x2F84 | 1704 bytes |
SHA-256: 3a2018c8664960654168e38c892c5447cda78961dab5cca0a31a78ccf1ee7c03 |
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font_02_cff_off0000370e.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x370E | 2169 bytes |
SHA-256: 9df0a2646412cc5259ae0cefc451bcf95d77deceaf88e9c71726ad76c6e9cc6c |
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font_03_sfnt_off0000486c.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x486C | 20000 bytes |
SHA-256: 88b7d59236ebe7d3a619e88b9d628af8c15e70b840b5d71a6ea836e3ba9ca257 |
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font_04_sfnt_off00007597.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7597 | 22100 bytes |
SHA-256: 29962898483da4f1e780897582c7e890b8e134bd95fa3af2aa6ab753a03c813a |
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font_06_sfnt_off0006e72c.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6E72C | 30860 bytes |
SHA-256: 93be4f311f91cd945c729ae8825330cd583d2f66992cf62705db9229f8542b0a |
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font_07_sfnt_off00072043.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x72043 | 436156 bytes |
SHA-256: 0a45a0cb62c95dfb945728b5a64a6cdcd660c5ce507ced26e1197733fb340e4c |
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font_08_sfnt_off00084f4a.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x84F4A | 30744 bytes |
SHA-256: 7039d96833314c529f7fefd443cebc36e4394f202dd4c7e16b5a21771e8ddb6e |
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font_09_sfnt_off00089a4f.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x89A4F | 17996 bytes |
SHA-256: 41930bc26ecc96796cd548f61d888844ad7b17f25992fd431c19969cb4850d18 |
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font_10_sfnt_off0008c222.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8C222 | 21424 bytes |
SHA-256: 5e473e39bf4739e2a7cfa7bed2da7a4baab8d3381a34090521730fc7929d14f9 |
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