Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 75dbd27ea32806d0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

90.4 KB Created: 2007-05-30 16:10:30 +01:00 Authoring application: PScript5.dll Version 5.2.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 7.0 (Windows)) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 89df0fa69f56951df86024896361c639 SHA-1: 18d933d416441929cbfc3be3e901bdec3f2cf8fb SHA-256: 75dbd27ea32806d0bb8647449249cbcd3cea3e48705dd6424e24b3874fab4942
596 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action for cmd.exe, which then renames an embedded file 'v.pdf' to 'v.exe' and executes it. This indicates the document is designed to drop and run a second-stage payload, likely a trojan given the ClamAV detection of 'Win.Trojan.Rozena-131' on the extracted artifact. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-21281 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-21281
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C (if exist "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents\\v.pdf" (cd "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 1 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 90 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL tcp://10.0.2.15:4455 In extracted file (v.pdf)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off00000552.icc)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
v.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 21 at offset 0x118D0 37888 bytes
SHA-256: a9a743b8f7e3e183e550f4da078969a1def26a188c2d1d8b39b5b448125240ff
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=v.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 10.0.2.15:4455 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0022_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 22 at offset 0x16523 50 bytes
SHA-256: 1affe0d2c731b7aae1910b7e72a56af0eab976a6b9a96ac1be841c778c70bfb2
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "v", nLaunch: 0 });
icc_00_off00000552.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x552 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e

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