Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d2160dd847bfb69c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

1.64 MB Created: 2009-09-29 17:07:39 Authoring application: Microsoft® Office Word 2007
MD5: da1d7f6726932979b0864d88bc7c92aa SHA-1: dfdbac878f76aaa81a11b655d587fd13c34edc21 SHA-256: d2160dd847bfb69cf80e174c4080247efa2f5a349d00e0746a9bf03d11bddbe3
546 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1200 Hardware Add-in T1071.001 Web Protocols

The PDF file contains a critical PDF_LAUNCH heuristic firing, indicating it attempts to execute a command. Specifically, it targets cmd.exe with parameters that suggest it will attempt to run a payload. Furthermore, a critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD firing confirms an embedded Windows executable, masquerading as 'FDCC.pdf'. The PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS heuristic indicates that JavaScript is used in conjunction with the launch action to drop the payload. The SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE heuristic suggests a social engineering tactic to prompt the user to install a fake update or plugin.

Heuristics 15

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED
    PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\FDCC.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.cnss.gov/Assets/pdf/cnssi_4009.pdf
    • http://checklists.nist.gov/
    • http://www.acquisition.gov/far/current/html/FARTOCP39.html
    • http://fdcc.nist.gov/
    • http://scap.nist.gov/
    • http://nvd.nist.gov/home.cfm?emaillist
    • http://nvd.nist.gov/scap/xccdf/docs/xccdf-spec-1.1.4-20071102.pdf
    • http://oval.mitre.org/
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/
    • http://nvd.nist.gov/fdcc/fdcc_faq.cfm
    • http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/omb/memoranda/fy2008/m08-22.pdf
    • http://nvd.nist.gov/
    • http://ovaldi.wiki.sourceforge.net/
    • http://www.us-cert.gov/
    • http://www.cert.org/
    • http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ305.107.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/drivers/documents/FISMA-final.pdf
    • http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a130/a130trans4.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-14/800-14.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-23/sp800-23.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-27A/SP800-27-RevA.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-28-ver2/SP800-28v2.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-30/sp800-30.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-36/NIST-SP800-36.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-40-Ver2/SP800-40v2.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-44-ver2/SP800-44v2.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-45-version2/SP800-45v2.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-46-rev1/sp800-46r1.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-48-rev1/SP800-48r1.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-53-Rev3/sp800-53-rev3-final-errata.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-61-rev1/SP800-61rev1.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/itsec/guidance_WinXP.html
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/itsec/guidance_WinXP_Home.html
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-83/SP800-83.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-97/SP800-97.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-115/SP800-115.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-123/SP800-123.pdf
    • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips199/FIPS-PUB-199-final.pdf
    • https://iase.disa.mil/techguid/stigs.html
    • http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/index.html
    • http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA393328
    • http://www.nsa.gov/ia/
    • http://nvd.nist.gov/scap/content/SCAP-WinXPPro.zip
    • http://www.iec.ch

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
FDCC.pdf
9ec07804db9d60e32fe79f7b62618e54dd20ee6548ed37771c9599afbb247750		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 3766 at offset 0x19F0E6 37888 bytes
javascript_obj3767_000.js
68c0a333ba51942446a6cbf0932d03ca57378e6a0749b452a9c19b5678e5b15a		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 3767 at offset 0x1A3DA0 53 bytes
stream_106_off0017e28f.bin
e772c4b6d5ed1efdd050699dff6c1afc179da174775b584be47aab00a5e3ce09		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x17E28F 24176 bytes

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