Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 67601a6696e04ebf…

MALICIOUS

PDF

1.26 MB Created: 2006-12-13 12:53:23 -05:00 Authoring application: Acrobat PDFMaker 7.0.7 for Word (via Acrobat Distiller 7.0.5 (Windows)) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: a5a9624f164c6519cf2bdf28ad110efd SHA-1: 9e1a735259b4260d21ef7e4d05caf4be0b4fdcd5 SHA-256: 67601a6696e04ebfbec4e2dd8cd0a98d5291060b0772a36f66a8e33a8e6a777d
578 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a JavaScript action that triggers a launch action, exploiting CVE-2010-1240 to execute cmd.exe. This action is designed to export an embedded file named 'file.pdf', which is actually a Windows executable payload. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Rozena-131, and the PDF itself was flagged as Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9917

Heuristics 14

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\file.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.ontgeocaching.com/oga-election_policies.htm In PDF document text
    • http://www.ontgeocaching.comIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ontgeocaching.com/oga-store.htmIn PDF document text
    • http://waterfallsofontario.ca/)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ontgeocaching.com/oga-election_policies.htm)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ontgeocaching.com/)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ontgeocaching.com/oga-store.htm)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/profile/Default.aspx?guid=3a309c38-e0ad-4120-80ea-8faecce620a8PDF link annotation
    • http://www.geocaching.com/profile/Default.aspx?guid=894f82e3-a80f-430d-b96e-76f66e12d746In PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/track/geocoin.aspxIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/profile/Default.aspx?guid=3a309c38-e0ad-4120-80ea-8faecce620a8)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/profile/Default.aspx?guid=894f82e3-a80f-430d-b96e-76f66e12d746)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/profile/?guid=e14fe921-38f9-4295-ad78-fc368c60c901)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/profile/Default.aspx?guid=4ef6ab2d-187e-4177-9378-35560e320e54)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/track/geocoin.aspx)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/profile/Default.aspx?guid=840214d1-2d5d-48f0-afb1-db432c7a871b)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/profile/Default.aspx?guid=b8c31eb7-8502-496d-b71e-ff50c1963028)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/profile/Default.aspx?guid=84c8b659-8052-436b-a601-b33a15086560)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/profile/?guid=30af18ac-4c8f-4a99-8c1a-d56d0d2c3042)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/profile/Default.aspx?guid=afc8fcb1-eebb-4b51-a6d8-a497e00d5f7a)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/seek/cache_details.aspx?guid=ca328415-79ff-4d4a-9fa6-b81769d8aad8)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/profile/Default.aspx?guid=9867f8f7-1d23-441b-9aa2-7b599a2ffdd6)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/seek/cache_details.aspx?guid=7ff5d966-3e6e-4e6a-a171-31d022b61413)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/seek/cache_details.aspx?guid=468d896a-e204-450b-a07d-5027262cece3)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/profile/Default.aspx?guid=493d2790-127f-4c66-ad0c-0b245a3aabba)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/profile/Default.aspx?guid=653b46e4-20bb-487b-9181-c119a2469dbc)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/profile/Default.aspx?guid=3d0ea45d-8ba2-46d9-b30e-4dbaa44c7120)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/profile/Default.aspx?guid=7f505caf-0838-4147-b60e-9276279e239a)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/seek/cache_details.aspx?guid=65c6763c-3361-4baf-b724-e98df899acff)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.geocaching.com/seek/cache_details.aspx?guid=dbfcd72e-fe32-45b7-88e1-8432d497552d)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off00005bbb.icc)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
file.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 785 at offset 0x13E8A8 37888 bytes
SHA-256: 7ac2db31e89e0bf55a48f5044fda3fd51afe261f268a7933690bd8ff79731ac5
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=file.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0786_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 786 at offset 0x14353C 53 bytes
SHA-256: a51396c74bd43c70b96b2f055287709b214cf3f847ffcb3878ffc071376c425d
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "file", nLaunch: 0 });
icc_00_off00005bbb.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x5BBB 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e