Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ba9a850bb34326a5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

419.8 KB Created: 2010-04-21 16:36:48 Authoring application: Scribus 1.3.6 (via Scribus PDF Library 1.3.6) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: e8cb687e2ca5b6c9c04d7006efaa7488 SHA-1: 769441e8466d7bc698e97f96de3936a3734c9336 SHA-256: ba9a850bb34326a582b67a6981c9c51037fc05bdf279215bd15937d7768347ca
578 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that uses the `exportDataObject` function to launch an embedded executable disguised as 'plaquette_adelux.pdf'. This executable is detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Rozena-131. The PDF also contains a launch action for `cmd.exe`, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands, likely to facilitate the execution of the embedded payload. The embedded executable is likely a Metasploit stager.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9995

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\plaquette_adelux.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.adelux.fr In PDF document text
    • tcp://192.168.100.99:443In extracted file (plaquette_adelux.pdf)
    • http://www.monotype.comMonotypeIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00004aa7.bin)
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_arial.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00004aa7.bin)
    • https://www.verisign.com/repository/RPA0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00004aa7.bin)
    • https://www.verisign.com/repository/CPS��In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00004aa7.bin)
    • https://www.verisign.comIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00004aa7.bin)
    • https://www.verisign.com/repository/verisignlogo.gif0�In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00004aa7.bin)
    • https://www.verisign.com/CPSIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00004aa7.bin)
    • https://www.verisign.com/repository/CPSIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00004aa7.bin)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/truetype/0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00004aa7.bin)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
plaquette_adelux.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 187 at offset 0x63D1A 37888 bytes
SHA-256: 9cbd1c481625a9954cd4a48612c545456575901a7d8e823942d2824c9e8a1af8
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=plaquette_adelux.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.100.99:443 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0188_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 188 at offset 0x68A2B 65 bytes
SHA-256: a2fc18178b351d4e0fe032ac5a3954169fcf3c514035151eaec20961363159d0
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "plaquette_adelux", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off00004aa7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4AA7 224692 bytes
SHA-256: 2f371cd9d96b3ac544519d85c16dc43ceacdfcea35090ee8ddf3ec5857c50328

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.