Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f95c10997847798b…

MALICIOUS

RTF

736.6 KB Created: 2020-06-09 12:34:00
MD5: 80294641ee395491eb14e8eb4c114bc4 SHA-1: feb0b57a46302bbbe75d3f692828c65e9904e8ee SHA-256: f95c10997847798bf4549878ebcb058930127f11cdb742f68357d5f4a8327e98
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploitation for CVE-2017-8570 and CVE-2017-8759, which are known vulnerabilities related to OLE object activation. These exploits are designed to drop and execute a script, likely a second-stage payload. The document body content appears to be garbled or malformed, providing no clear user-facing lure.

Heuristics 8

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/w

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000132c1.bin
3bae9fa7e10aab15493e15cb39cafe902632341695092964fbb4555576a7334e		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x132C1 221081 bytes
objdata_01_off00019a70.bin
aa157b348e4d0e4dc38a7b3d5bba9a9241579ef5b40ab3911ed318a6a0df41b1		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x19A70 221054 bytes
objdata_02_off00089f21.bin
51ef705eef602ac6eb91c2063c8f50d4e54b5e051b60429031d41133bc7df645		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x89F21 2632 bytes
objdata_03_off0008b4c4.bin
e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x8B4C4 12297 bytes

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